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Introduction
The federal government has traditionally had an adversarial re-
lationship with state and local governments in school desegregation
cases. Frequently, local school systems have either illegally segre-
gated children on the basis of race or failed to use their financial
resources to correct racial imbalance. Since nondiscrimination was
central to public policy in the 1960's, federal aid to schools was made
contingent upon nondiscriminatory practices. Recently, the Reagan
administration has taken steps to restore what it sees as harmony in
the area of education between the federal government and state and
local governments. This article explores the consequences of these
efforts, focusing specifically on the interaction between the "new fed-
eralism" in education and the school desegregation litigation in
Chicago.
In United States v. Board of Education ("Chicago") 1 the Reagan De-
partment of Justice ("DOJ") approved a plan designed by the Chi-
cago Board of Education (the "Board") which relied exclusively on
voluntary desegregation methods, such as magnet schools and major-
ity-to-minority transfers. Prior to Chicago, the federal government
had often sought comprehensive mandatory remedies (such as bus-
ing) in school desegregation lawsuits. The Reagan administration,
claiming that such mandatory techniques were ineffective, in this
case expressed both its clear preference for voluntary means of deseg-
* Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. B.A.,
1978, Georgetown University; J.D., 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. Mr. Devins' work on this
article was undertaken while he was a research associate at Vanderbilt University's Institute
for Public Policy Studies. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Commission on Civil Rights.
** Specialist in education, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. B.A.,
1972, Middlebury College; M.A., 1973, Harvard University. The views expressed are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Congressional Research Service.
The term "new federalism" in education is applied to the Reagan administration's efforts
to reduce federal involvement in education, as well as to legislative and judicial responses to
those efforts.
1 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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regation and its willingness to accommodate local preferences. The
district court agreed.
The Chicago court upheld the Board's plan as constitutional,
holding that voluntary techniques can satisfy the Supreme Court's
requirement that desegregation remedies be effective.2 The court ap-
parently believed that together the city and the federal government
would provide enough money to upgrade the schools, thus giving
white students a significant incentive to attend the newly-enhanced
minority schools. Without this money, the voluntary desegregation
plan was unlikely to be effective.
At the same time that the Reagan administration has been will-
ing to approve school desegregation remedies that suit local prefer-
ences, it has had some success in introducing and gaining legislative
acceptance of a "new federalism" in education, aimed at reducing
federal involvement. In 1981, categorical aid designed to encourage
the adoption of federally-approved school desegregation programs
was eliminated along with other categorical aid programs.3 These
programs were replaced by a block grant of federal funds which local
school systems could spend to suit their own preferences. This block
grant approach presumes that, overall, federal and state and local
policy goals are in harmony with each other. As the Reagan admin-
istration contends, "[t]he Federal role is to supply necessary re-
sources, not to specify in excruciating detail what must be done with
these resources." 4
Chicago suggests some of the limits of the present education block
grant for financing school desegregation. First, the block grant ap-
proach does not concentrate federal funding on districts facing the
high costs of desegregation. Second, since local school districts histor-
ically have not undertaken school desegregation without outside
pressure, they should not be expected to use these block grant funds
for such activities. Third, since the block grant does not provide lo-
cal school systems with an incentive to undertake such projects, the
Reagan administration's pursuit of voluntary desegregation may be
adversely affected by its "new federalism" in education. In short, if
the federal government views desegregation as a compelling national
2 See text accompanying notes 140-85 infra. Unlike Chicago, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on this issue centered on the scope of mandatory pupil transportation remedies. See, e.g.,
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 536 (1979).
3 See text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
4 WHITE HousE, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOV-
ERY 7-1 (1981).
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policy objective, it cannot use a block grant funding structure which
relies on local initiative.
This article analyzes the Chicago school desegregation litigation
in the context of past and current federal equal educational opportu-
nity policy. The first section gives an overview of federal policy on
equal educational opportunity. It highlights the way federal finan-
cial assistance was used from 1965 to 1980 to encourage local school
desegregation. The second section analyzes the Chicago litigation. It
discusses the development and court approval of the Board's volun-
tary desegregation plan, and the impact of Chicago on the Reagan
administration's efforts to have local school systems develop desegre-
gation plans. The third section summarizes the questions that Chi-
cago raises for federal policy.
I. Federal Assistance for Equal Educational Opportunity
Over the past two decades, the federal government has pursued
a goal of equal educational opportunity. Federal funding has been
used in two ways to advance school desegregation-as leverage to
secure compliance with civil rights mandates, and as direct support
of desegregation-related activities. The Reagan administration's
"new federalism" policy has reconsidered the federal role in educa-
tion, particularly federal efforts to secure equal educational
opportunity.
Federal financial assistance to elementary and secondary schools
was critical to achieving the first substantial breaches in the southern
system of segregated schools. Between the mid 1960's and 1980, the
federal government used legislative and judicial sanctions backed by
substantial amounts of federal aid for education to secure equal edu-
cational opportunity for blacks on a nationwide basis. During the
1970's, it also gave direct financial assistance to help school districts
throughout the country implement desegregation plans. The earlier
federal policy of deference to local interests in education and concern
that federal education initiatives not diminish local control of educa-
tion were subordinated to the pursuit of the national goal of equal
educational opportunity. As a result, the federal attitude toward cer-
tain local school systems through much of this period was often one
of distrust. Federal administrators were unsure of those systems' will-
ingness or ability to address minorities' educational needs. Begin-
ning in 1981, the Reagan administration sought to restore the pre-
1960's harmony between federal and local interests in education.
[Vol. 59:1243]
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One result was the elimination of any significant federal aid for
school districts' desegregation efforts.
A. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
In the decade following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,5 that "in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place," less actual desegregation of
southern schools occurred than in 1965. The implementation of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"),6 cou-
pled with the issuance and enforcement of guidelines for Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 marked a significant shift in the rela-
tionship between the federal government and local school systems.
The primary purpose of federal financial assistance for education was
no longer to help schools do better what they were already doing;
rather, it was to remedy their failure to provide equal educational
opportunity to black children.8 Equal educational opportunity be-
came a powerful, almost irresistible, motive for initiating federal edu-
cation programs from the middle 1960's through the end of the
1970's.
Before ESEA's passage, there was little conflict over local school
officials' desire for autonomy in school administration.9 The major
pre-ESEA programs provided federal assistance for vocational educa-
tion; 10 for school districts adversely affected by the presence of mili-
tary bases and other federal installations;"1 and for strengthening
science, mathematics, and modern foreign language instruction. 12
5 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
6 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 92 Stat. 2153 (1965); S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE
OF EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968). For the 1965-66 school year, the percentage
of black children in biracial schools in the 11 southern states rose from 2% to 6%. In 1965,
more districts started the desegregation process than had done so in the 10 years since 1954.
For a description of ESEA, see text accompanying notes 19-20 infra.
7 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964).
8 P. PETERSON, BACKGROUND PAPER, in Making the Grade: Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, 83-105
(1983); 5 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL
ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: INTERGOVERNMENTALIZING THE CLASSROOM 31-36
(1981); Hartle & Holland, The Changing Context of Federal Education Aid, 15 EDUC. & URB.
Soc'Y 408-31 (1983).,
9 P. PETERSON, supra note 8, at 61.
10 E.g., Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 929; Vocational Education Act of 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-210, 77 Stat. 403.
11 "Impact Aid" laws: Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950); Pub. L. No. 81-815, 64
Stat. 967, 976 (1950).
12 Title III, National Defense Education Act ["NDEA"] of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72
Stat. 1580, 1588-90.
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These programs, often initiated by a sense of national emergency,
maintained the traditional balance between federal and local inter-
ests. The school desegregation issue was set aside in the face of other
crises. 13
Congress set the stage for a new kind of federal involvement in
education when in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 it de-
clared, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."1 4 Although
compliance with this mandate was initially to be sought through vol-
untary means, continued noncompliance could trigger the termina-
tion of federal funds.' 5
Title VI's passage was crucial to the enactment one year later of
major federal elementary and secondary education programs. Until
1964, the question of segregated school systems' use of federal money
had derailed numerous efforts to secure general assistance for elemen-
tary and secondary education. 16 Title VI, originally a bargaining
chip in the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress
by President Kennedy,' 7 removed that question. 18
Despite a decade-long fight by advocates of general federal aid
to education, the new programs enacted in 1965 focused on the local
school systems' failure to provide equal educational opportunities to
disadvantaged children. In ESEA, Congress declared:
[It is] to be the policy of the United States to provide financial
assistance . .. to local educational agencies serving areas with
13 P. PETERSON, supra note 8,61-81; G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN
EDucATIoN: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4-15, 26-27 (1969); ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, 1-10.
14 Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252.
15 Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252. Title
IV of the Act provided federal assistance for training and advisory services to address racial,
religious, national origin, and sex desegregation issues in schools. This program continues to
be funded separately ($24 million for fiscal year 1984), although its activities are among those
authorized for the new education block grant. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 72 Stat. 346 (1968); see
note 67 infra.
16 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 19-
29; S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, supra note 6, at 21-22; Hartle & Holland, supra note 8, at 417.
17 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 35, 39.
18 Another potential roadblock to major federal assistance to schools, the long-standing
question of the participation of parochial schools in federal education aid programs, was fi-
nessed in 1965 by use of the "child-benefit" approach, whereby federally-financed services
were provided to private school students with federal dollars remaining in public hands. See
P. MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN 1965: A STUDY IN POLIT-
ICAL INNOVATION 71, 81 (1967).
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concentrations of children from low-income families to expand
and improve their educational programs by various means . . .
which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational
needs of educationally deprived children.19
Although ESEA authorized funding for school libraries, textbooks,
centers for developing exemplary programs for educational improve-
ment, education research, and grants to strengthen state departments
of education, the heart of the bill was its billion dollar program of aid
for the compensatory education of educationally deprived children.
This program set the terms for the "long awaited breakthrough in
federal aid to education." 20
ESEA changed the tone and nature of federal involvement in
education. Directed to local school systems' inability or unwilling-
ness to address the needs of disadvantaged children, it clearly sig-
nalled that certain federal educational concerns were not necessarily
in harmony with, or furthered by, local educational practices. In
time, federal distrust of some local school systems grew. One mani-
festation was concern over possible local misuse of federal funds.
"The federal government no longer assumed that local governments
could operate federal programs without much supervision, became
suspicious that funds were being diverted from statutory purposes,
and launched a wide variety of studies and evaluations to ascertain
program impact. '21
The experience in the mid 1960's of Department of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare ("HEW") officials, seeking Title VI compliance
from school districts receiving significant amounts of new ESEA
funding, fed the federal government's distrust of local school sys-
tems. 22 Despite widespread initiation of school desegregation activi-
ties, the more actual desegregation required by the federal guidelines,
the greater the local resistance.
As HEW read Title VI's legislative history, its requirements
were consonant with current court rulings. 23 As a result, it inter-
preted Title VI's desegregation requirements as being both flexible
and potentially expansive. Regulations issued by HEW in Decem-
ber, 1964, stated that districts would be considered in compliance
19 Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 2, 79 Stat. 27, 27 (1965).
20 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 31.
21 P. PETERSON, supra note 8, at 83-84.
22 For a detailed analysis of the implementation of the Title VI guidelines, see G.
ORFIELD, supra note 13. Many of the points made immediately below are drawn from his
account.
23 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 43, 93.
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with Title VI if they were subject to a court order or if they submit-
ted a desegregation plan subsequently approved by the Commis-
sioner of Education. 24 As judicial standards developed calling for the
immediate elimination of dual school systems, 25 and as the passage of
ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern school districts
of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for gradual transi-
tion [was converted] into an engine of revolution. '26
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in 1965, required the de-
segregation of all grades by 1967.27 They specified that, at a mini-
mum, affected districts would have to desegregate four grades (five in
some instances) for the 1965-66 academic year. Districts could
demonstrate their compliance by filing an assurance of compliance
(not acceptable for districts with continuing dual system practices),
coming under a court order, or filing an acceptable desegregation
plan.28
In 1966 HEW issued revised guidelines for the 1966-67 school
year. They set performance standards for desegregation in affected
districts and included faculty integration. 29 The revised guidelines
set more rigorous standards for freedom-of-choice plans, reflecting in-
creasing concern that these plans were intended primarily to main-
tain dual school systems, not dismantle them.30
By the third year of Title VI's enforcement, the resistance of
state and local officials and Congress' restiveness over HEW's height-
ened demands for desegregation were strong enough to freeze the
guidelines. No changes were made for the 1967-68 school year.3 ' By
then the requirements of federal court rulings on school desegrega-
tion began to exceed the HEW requirements. 3 2
24 21 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 568 (1965).
25 See notes 102-06 infra.
26 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 45.
27 Id at 98; 21 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 569.
28 Id
29 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 146; Toward Equal Educational Opportunilp, Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, S. REP. No. 92-000, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1972).
30 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 146-47; Toward Equal Educational Opportuniy, supra note
29, at 196-197.
31 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 258.
32 Id The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity in its report
describes a process in which HEW requirements more closely paralleled court action, indeed
anticipated the mandates of Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). That deci-
sion held that freedom of choice plans per se did not constitute compliance with Brown.
Rather, the obligation of school districts was to implement a plan that would in fact desegre-
gate schools "now." Id at 439. The Select Committee reports that two months prior to that
decision, HEW had issued new school desegregation guidelines "adopting an identical posi-
tion." S. REP. No. 92-000, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1972); see notes 102-04 infra.
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By 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the exec-
utive and legislative branches were increasingly found opposing the
federal courts on school desegregation questions. 33 Mounting con-
cern over the extension of desegregation to districts outside the
South, and heightened opposition to the use of mandatory reassign-
ments ("busing"), led to increased efforts by both branches to curb
federal action in school desegregation. 34
Almost as quickly as they had coalesced, the forces that made
the first substantial inroads into the South's segregated school sys-
tems were challenged and ultimately dissipated. Congressional reac-
tion to HEW's enforcement, cast in part as concern about improper
extension of federal control over education, succeeded in slowing the
momentum of the federal enforcement efforts. Although federal
court decisions continued to challenge local school policies and prac-
tices on questions of race, the "rare historic moment when the Presi-
dent, congressional leadership, and the public all recognized that
protection of the rights of black Americans was the fundamental [so-
cial and educational] issue" had passed. 35 Repeated congressional
efforts to curb HEW's enforcement of Title VI finally resulted in lan-
guage that significantly limited its authority, particularly with re-
33 G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus?: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY 243
(1978).
34 G. ORFIELD, supra note 33, at 235-42. The mandatory reassignment of children was
opposed by the President who was wedded to the neighborhood schools as the basis for school
assignments. In his March 24, 1970, statement on school desegregation, President Nixon
stated:
I am dedicated to continued progress toward a truly desegregated public school
system. But, considering the always heavy demands for more school operating
funds, I believe it is preferable, when we have to make the choice, to use limited
financial resources for the improvement of education-for better teaching facilities,
better methods, and advanced educational materials-and for the upgrading of the
disadvantaged areas in the community rather than buying buses, tires, and gasoline
to transport young children miles away from their neighborhood schools.
Statement by the President Setting Forth Administration Policies, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 424, 428 (Mar. 30, 1970); see also Federal Poliqy Switch Slows School Desegregation, 28 CONG.
Q. at 805-11 (Mar. 20, 1970).
In Congress, there have been repeated efforts to define the scope of the 1964 civil rights
statutes and the administrative activities taken on their behalf. Efforts made to preclude their
application to defacto school segregation included the language in section 401 of Title IV of
the Civil Rights Act defining the term "desegregation" as not including assignment to address
racial imbalance, and the amendments offered in 1968 by Representative Whitten to the
HEW FY 1969 appropriations bill to prohibit the use of HEW funds to require school dis-
tricts to assign students to any particular school (amended in the legislative process to limit
their application to defacto segregation). Pub. L. No. 90-557, 82 Stat. 969, 994-95 (1968). Of
interest, the Whitten amendments have been added to every HEW or Department of Educa-
tion appropriations act since then.
35 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 39.
[19841
NEW FEDERALISM IN EDUCATION
gard to mandatory reassignments. 36 Nevertheless, by the end of the
1960's, the efforts of the federal government had dramatically eroded
southern school segregation. For example, between 1963 and 1968,
the percentage of black children in all-black schools in the South
dropped from ninety-eight percent to twenty-five percent.37
B. The Emergenc School Assistance Program of 1970
The federal courts heightened their demands for desegregation
in the late 1960S.38 Southern school officials were faced with the task
of immediately eliminating their dual systems. President Nixon
called for federal funds to assist "school districts in meeting special
problems incident to court-ordered desegregation. ' 39 He requested
$500 million in fiscal year ("FY") 1971 funds and $1 billion in FY
1972 funds for the effort.4 0 He justified this substantial financial in-
vestment in school desegregation as follows:
Communities desegregating their schools face special needs-for
classrooms, facilities, teachers, teacher training-and the Nation
should help meet those needs.
The Nation also has a vital and special stake in upgrading
education where defacto segregation persists-and where extra ef-
forts are needed if the schools are to do their job. These schools,
too, need extra money for teachers and facilities.4'
Devised as part of Nixon's "southern strategy" to foster Republican
party support in the South,42 the funding proposal gained backing
from school officials and desegregation advocates. 43 The Emergency
36 The so-called Eagleton-Biden amendment, attached to every piece of HEW or Depart-
ment of Education appropriations legislation since 1977, reads as follows:
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to require, directly or
indirectly, the transportation of any student to a school other than the school which
is nearest the student's home, except for a student requiring special education, in
order to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the purpose of
this section an indirect requirement of transportation of student includes the trans-
portation of students to carry out a plan involving the reorganization of the grade
structure of schools, the pairing of schools, or the clustering of schools, or any combi-
nation of grade restructuring, pairing, or clustering. The prohibition described in
this section does not include the establishment of magnet schools.
Pub. L. 98-139, § 306, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (1983).
37 G. ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5
(1983).
38 See notes 102-07 infra.
39 Statement by the President, supra note 34, at 436.
40 Id
41 Id
42 P. PErERSON, supra note 8, at 126-27.
43 G. ORFIELD, supra note 33, at 245.
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School Assistance Program ("ESAP") was initiated with funds ap-
propriated under discretionary authority of the Commissioner of Ed-
ucation in 1970, and $171 million was provided for it over the course
of its slightly more than two year existence. 44
C. The Emergency School Aid Act of 1972
ESAP was hastily assembled and several evaluations concluded
that it was poorly administered.45 The General Accounting Office
studied the program and concluded that its funds had frequently
been awarded to segregated districts and often were not used to fur-
ther desegregation. 46 After protracted congressional debate, ESAP's
successor, the Emergency School Aid Act ("ESAA"), was enacted as
part of the Education Amendments of 1972.4 7 Designed to avoid
many of its predecessor's failings, including the funding of segregated
districts, ESAA imposed strict non-discrimination standards for
school districts' eligibility. Compliance was to be determined by a
"pre-grant" review of the applicant school districts. 48 To be eligible,
districts had to be implementing a plan requiring desegregation of
children or faculty pursuant to either a final court order or an order
of a state agency or official, a desegregation plan approved under
Title VI, or a voluntary plan for the elimination of minority group
isolation.
Between FY 1973 and FY 1981, $2.2 billion was provided to
desegregating school districts under ESAA for staff training, addi-
tional staff, new curriculum development, community relations ac-
tivities, and in its final years, the financing of magnet schools. 49
Amended several times over the course of the decade, ESAA in its
last two years focused increasingly on activities directly related to the
implementation of desegregation plans and on those districts most
recently adopting desegregation plans, rather than on compensatory
education (an approved use of funds before passage of the Education
44 The Emergency School Aid Act, 9 AM. EDUC. 9 (1973).
45 G. ORFIELD, supra note 33, at 246-47.
46 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED TO IMPROVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR
APPROVING GRANTS UNDER THE EMERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Mar. 5,
197 1); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAKNESSES IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS' IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF EMERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Sept. 29, 1971).
47 Title VII, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
48 J. Stedman, The Possible Impact of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 on
Activities That Have Been Funded Under the Emergency SchoolAidAct, Congressional Research Serv-
ice (Jan. 11, 1982), reprinted in School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 733-54 (1982).
49 Id
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Amendments of 1978).5 0 Over time, the "emergency" that the pro-
gram addressed evolved from meeting immediate desegregation re-
quirements to resolving the enduring problems associated with school
desegregation. 51 It must be noted that ESAA funds were not to be
used for student transportation (a restriction particularly opposed by
local school officials) and were not to supplant state or local funds.52
Until passage of the Education Amendments of 1978, the latter re-
quirement proscribed the use of ESAA funds for court-ordered activi-
ties under eligible desegregation plans.53
D. ESAA.s Pre-Grant Review
HEW's pre-grant review process merits additional scrutiny. For
most of the program's anti-discrimination provisions, disproportion-
ate impact of a school district's policies or practices on minority chil-
dren or faculty was sufficient for a finding of ineligibility.54 But
school districts found in violation of those provisions could secure
waivers of ineligibility if they agreed to take specific, remedial deseg-
regation actions.55 HEW had to initiate court-ordered Title VI com-
pliance proceedings against any district that failed to secure a waiver
of its ineligible status under the ESAA pre-grant review process.56
One measure of the effectiveness of the pre-grant review is the
extent to which ineligible districts secured waivers. Between FY 1975
and FY 1981, of the 731 districts declared ineligible (excluding those
incorrectly identified by HEW to be in violation), 502 or sixty-nine
percent secured waivers.57 During a particular two-year period, the
50 Title VI, Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, § 601, 92 Stat. 2143,
2250-68.
51 L. FERRARA, E. REISNER, B. GUTMANN, & M. BRAUEN, EMERGENCY SCHOOL AID
A T (ESAA): A FEDERAL PROGRAM TO MEET DESEGREGATION RELATED NEEDS, DECI-
SION RESOURCES 3, 7-8 (Aug. 1982)(draft prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Educ.).
52 G. ORFIELD, supra note 33, at 246; L. FERRARA, supra note 5 1, at 13.
53 L. FERRARA, supra note 51, at 13.
54 See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
55 A local educational agency was ineligible if, after June 23, 1972, it had: (1) transferred
property or given services to a private school or system without first determining that it was
not racially segregated and did not discriminate; (2) discriminated in the hiring, promoting,
or assigning of employees; (3) assigned children to or within classes so that minority group
students were separated from others for a substantial part of the day; or (4) discriminated in
any other way, such as limiting the activities in which minority group children might partici-
pate. 20 U.S.C.. § 3196 (prior to repeal).
56 Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977). Cal/fano validated the effort of
civil rights plaintiffs to force HEW to comply with its earlier specified effects-oriented require-
ments. Califano arose in the context of public higher education desegregation plans, but its
principle extends broadly to Title VI compliance procedures.
57 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 747. A significant portion of those failing to secure waiv-
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pre-grant review process resulted in the reassignment of approxi-
mately 244,000 school children from racially isolated classes. 58 A for-
mer director of the Office for Civil Rights, the entity within HEW
responsible for the pre-grant reviews, testified before a congressional
subcommittee: "It is our judgment that the pre-grant conditions of
the kind contained in the ESAA statute are among the most effective
ways of enforcing non-discrimination provisions of law and ensuring
equal opportunities for the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of
federal financial assistance. '59
E. The "New Federalism" in Education- Chapter 2 of The Education
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981
During the Carter administration, ESAA was modified by the
Education Amendments of 1978 in response to criticism that it was
unduly funding old desegregation plans and that its funds were used
excessively for compensatory education, an activity already being
funded by Title I of ESEA. 60 Yet it remained a significant source of
federal assistance for school desegregation, with annual appropria-
tions in some years exceeding $300 million.61
With the advent of the Reagan administration, ESAA ran afoul
of the "new federalism" in education. On February 18, 1981, the
White House issued "America's New Beginning: A Program for Eco-
nomic Recovery," 62 a lengthy list of proposed changes to federal pro-
grams to reduce federal expenditures and the federal presence in
many areas of domestic life. For elementary and secondary educa-
tion, it called for consolidating forty-five federal programs in order to
"shift control over education policy away from the Federal Govern-
ment and back to State and local authorities-where it constitution-
ally and historically belongs."163 In support of its block grant
program, the administration argued:
ers were ineligible because their desegregation plans were ineligible, not because of civil rights
violations.
58 Id at 748.
59 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 749 (statement of David S. Tatel). For another positive
assessment of the pre-grant review process, see P. HILL & E. MARKS, FEDERAL INFLUENCE
OVER STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN EDUCA-
TION (Dec. 1982)(prepared by the Rand Corp. for the Nat'l Institute of Educ.). It must be
stressed that evaluations of the programs supported by ESAA fundini are mixed. J.
Stedman, supra note 48, at 744-45.
60 See notes 50 and 53 supra.
61 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 736.
62 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4.
63 Id at 7-1.
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Existing multiple program requirements are burdensome, inflexi-
ble, unresponsive, and duplicative, resulting in waste of resources
at all levels of government; the block grant approach will elimi-
nate such unneeded Federal rules. The Federal role is to supply
necessary resources, not to specify in excruciating detail what
must be done with these resources. 64
Among the Reagan administration's first actions in the area of
school desegregation was to request a cut of $59.3 million in FY 1981
ESAA funds.65 The Senate, newly under Republican control, sought
to cut ESAA funding by $117.8 million, or fifty percent. This effort
was compromised in a conference committee with the House on the
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, 1981. ESAA's FY
1981 funding was reduced by $87.1 million, from $236.3 million to
$149.2 million. 66 Then in midyear, the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 198167 (the legislative response to the administration's call
for the "new federalism" in education), repealed over two dozen sep-
arate categorical education programs and authorized their various
activities in a new education block grant, Chapter 2 of the Education
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 ("Chapter 2").68
Among the programs repealed and consolidated was ESAA, the only
repealed program targeted at minority school children. 69
Although ESAA's inclusion in the education block grant
aroused little public debate, it became clear at the end of 1981 and
the beginning of 1982 that school districts with significant ESAA
funding were likely to experience dramatic reductions under Chapter
2. The Chapter 2 allocation process spreads funds across potentially
64 Id The criticism leveled at federal education programs by the Reagan administration
is supported by many who feel that federal dollars, constituting only 8.6% of all public school
expenditures in 1981-82, have been used excessively to direct and control local education.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1982,
at 21, table 14 (1982).
65 46 Fed. Reg. 18,210 (1981).
66 127 CONG. REC. H2645 (daily ed. June 4, 1981). The legislation was signed into law
as Pub. L. No. 97-12, 95 Stat. 14 (1981).
67 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
68 Title V, Subtitle D, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 469-80 (1981).
69 L. DARLING-HAMMOND & E. MARKS, THE NEW FEDERALISM IN EDUCATION: STATE
RESPONSES TO THE 1981 EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT 18
(1983) (prepared by the Rand Corp. for the U.S. Dep't of Educ.). Three categories of activi-
ties are authorized by Chapter 2: basic skills development, education improvement and sup-
port services, and special projects. The second of these categories authorizes the activities
formerly funded by ESAA. These are described as programs to address educational problems
stemming from the isolation of minority group students, to develop and implement desegre-
gation plans, and to meet the needs of children in schools undergoing desegregation.
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all 16,000 local school districts to be used for activities previously
authorized by many separate categorical programs. 70 In addition, in
its first two years of operation, fewer dollars were available for Chap-
ter 2 activities than had been appropriated in FY 1981 for the ante-
cedent programs. 71 The House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights reported in March, 1982, that as a result of
these funding reductions, desegregation activities "will diminish if-
not disappear in many communities. For example, the funding for
fiscal year 1982 for the entire State of Delaware [under Chapter 2] is
50 percent less than the 1981 ESAA funding just for the New Castle
County school district. '' 72 Among the Nation's largest school dis-
tricts, those with FY 1981 ESAA grants of over $1 million lost be-
tween six and seventy-nine percent of their antecedent federal
funding in FY 1981 under the block grant. 73
Local school districts, given the freedom under Chapter 2 to
choose among a relatively broad array of activities, appear unlikely
to direct their funding to desegregation. The most popular expendi-
ture has been on instructional equipment (reported by over eighty-
eight percent of the districts responding to one survey).74 One expla-
nation of the interest in equipment, particularly computer hardware,
is that many districts received relatively small grants, insufficient for
initiating any broad-based programs. 75 Spending on ESAA-like ac-
70 Chapter 2 allocates its funding among the states according to each state's share of the
national population aged 5 to 17. At least 80% of the state's allocation must be distributed to
local educational agencies using a state-derived formula. That formula must be based on
public and private school enrollments, adjusted to reflect "high cost" students (those from
low-income families, those in economically-depressed area, or those living in sparsely popu-
lated areas). Local school authorities have complete discretion to choose among the various
activities authorized by Chapter 2. Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 563, 565-66, 95 Stat. 357, 469-71
(1981) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3813, 3815-16 (1982)).
71 According to "The Fiscal Year 1983 Budget," released by the Department of Educa-
tion on Feb. 8, 1982, the FY 1981 appropriation for the antecedent programs to Chapter 2
was $537.485 million. The Departments' "The Fiscal Year 1984 Budget," released Jan. 31,
1983, lists the FY 1982 appropriation for Chapter 2 at $470.4 million. "The Fiscal Year 1985
Budget," released Feb. 1, 1984, reports that the FY 1983 appropriation for Chapter 2 was
$479.42 million. (These Budgets on file with authors.)
72 School Desegregation, H.R. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982).
73 R. JUNG & T. BARTELL, FISCAL EFFECTS OF THE CHAPTER 2, ECIA BLOCK GRANT
ON THE LARGEST DISTRICTS AND CITIES 11, 13 tables 3 & 4 (May 1983)(prepared by Ad-
vanced Technology, Inc., for the U.S. Dep't of Educ.). Of the 13 districts in this sample that
had FY 1981 ESAA awards in excess of $1 million, the entire Chapter 2 allocation for FY 1982
for 8 of them was less than their FY 1981 ESAA funding. Id
74 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, THE IMPACT OF CHAPTER 2
OF THE EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT ON LOCAL EDUCATION
AGENCIES 13, table 6 (1983).
75 Id at 18.
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tivities has been much less popular (reported by only six percent of
the responding districts) .76
F. Conclusions
Several points are made clear by reviewing the experience of
federal financial support of school desegregation over the past two
decades. The federal government has at its disposal a number of
tools for addressing equal educational opportunity in local school sys-
tems. In the mid 1960's, the prospect of substantial levels of ESAA
funding gave HEW's efforts to enforce Title VI an impact they
would otherwise not have had. But resistance grew as HEW in-
creased its demands for school desegregation as the price for federal
aid. Ultimately, HEW's enforcement was blunted, but the federal
courts handed down major decisions in the late 1960's and early
1970's that maintained the pressure for school desegregation. One
federal response to that pressure was to provide over $2 billion
through ESAA in support of desegregation-related activities in the
1970's.
In the 1980's, with the first major legislative step toward the
"new federalism" in education, financial support targeted at desegre-
gation was largely eliminated, and with it a means of pursuing equal
educational opportunity. The history of the period reveals that with-
out outside pressure, most school districts are not likely to pursue
that goal. Thus the present education block grant appears to exert
little or no leverage on school districts' desegregation practices. In-
deed, some have argued that the "new federalism" in education di-
rectly opposes certain other federal goals, including the achievement
of equal educational opportunity. 77
76 Id at 13, table 6. In addition, 5% of the responding districts spent their FY 1982
Chapter 2 dollars on "desegregation training and advisory services" (the activities authorized
by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Block Grants Have Weakened Federal Pro-
grams for the Educationaly Disadvantaged, Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Re-
sources of the Comm. on Govenment Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1983).
77 [W]hat is called the New Federalism is really equivalent to the pre-1960s old fed-
eralism, in which SLEAs [state and local educational agencies] simply made deci-
sions that satisfied their own priorities without considering those of the nation. That
was the driving force for the federal fiscal interventions in the first place. Unfortu-
nately, the dilemma of harmonizing educational policies at a state and local level
with the needs of the nation has not disappeared, and the New Federalism does not
represent a real alternative to federal fiscal policy in this area.
Levin, Federal Grants andEducational Equity, 52 HARV. EDUC. REv. 456 (1982); see also L. DAR-
LING-HAMMOND & E. MARKS, supra note 69, at 82.
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II. The Desegregation Litigation in Chicago
In his January 1983 decision, United States v. Board of Education,78
Judge Milton Shadur upheld as constitutional a desegregation plan
prepared by the Chicago Board of Education. The issue presented in
the case was significant since the plan, the result of a consent decree
betweeen the United States and the Board 7 9 was designed to deseg-
regate Chicago schools without mandatory pupil reassignments.80
The Chicago case is also significant as a manifestation of the
"new federalism": the Board was able to craft a desegregation plan
according to its own policy preferences. Previously, the federal gov-
ernment approached the remedial issue in school desegregation law-
suits in an adversarial manner-generally seeking comprehensive
remedies which included mandatory pupil reassignments. In Chicago,
the Reagan administration demonstrated that it would not ask for
busing.8 I
A. Background of Chicago
Under the Carter administration, federal efforts to require the
Board to desegregate its school system formally began on April 9,
1979,82 when HEW notified the Board that it was ineligible to re-
ceive ESAA funds because its practices constituted racial discrimina-
78 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
79 Order, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980).
80 See Glenn, Cautious Pragmatism in Chicago Plan, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1983, at 24; see also
notes 135-40 infra.
81 It is important to recognize that Congress has authorized the Department of Justice to
file desegregation lawsuits. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Department has acted on this
authority in almost every school desegregation lawsuit brought before the Supreme Court.
See amicus brief in Nashville. For a discussion of Reagan administration policies on this issue,
see notes 135-39 infa. Prior to the Reagan administration's antibusing policies, the Depart-
ment had almost always sought to expand both the bounds of the definition of illegal discrim-
ination and the parameters of desegregation remedies. The Reagan administration, however,
views the busing remedy as devisive and ineffective. See note 136 infra.
82 The federal concern with school desegregation in Chicago has a long history. In light
of the discussion in Section I, perhaps the most significant aspect of that federal concern was
the aborted effort in 1965 by HEW to cut off the flow of ESEA funds to the Chicago school
system. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 152-207; S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, supra note 6, at
151-53. Fear that the Chicago school superintendent might misuse the newly available ESEA
funds to maintain segregated schools prompted Commissioner of Education Keppel to defer
action on grants to the district. HEW had already initiated an investigation of the Chicago
schools in response to complaints of Title VI violations. Critics of the action quickly charac-
terized it as a federal effort to control education. Mayor Daley of Chicago spoke personally to
President Johnson about the issue at a meeting in New York. Shortly thereafter, HEW
agreed to release Chicago's funds in exchange for a commitment from the school board to
reaffirm earlier resolutions on school desegregation in the city and to investigate school at-
tendance boundaries.
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tion in violation of Title VI. On September 17, 1979, HEW
informed the Board that it would refer the matter to the DOJ in one
month if the Board had not by then rebutted or explained HEW's
finding of illegal segregation. 83 HEW also demanded that the Board
develop a plan to remedy its segregation. 84 On October 29, 1979,
HEW referred this matter to the DOJ.8 5 Despite its failure to secure
ESAA funding for the 1979-80 school year, the Board applied for the
same funding the next school year.86 HEW again refused the
request.8 7
Formal DOJ involvement began on April 21, 1980, when it noti-
fied the Board of its intention to file a desegregation lawsuit. 88 Fol-
lowing this announcement, the Board and DOJ sought through
negotiations to develop a traditional, mandatory student assignment
plan.8 9 The first negotiations failed since the parties could not agree
on either specific racial percentages for the reassignments or on the
amount of federal funds the Board would receive to implement such
a plan.90 After this round, a new Board took office and succeeded in
negotiating a consent decree.
At this stage, what was to become the Chicago lawsuit evi-
denced the type of give-and-take between the federal government
and local school systems typical of other desegregation cases. The
Board wanted federal dollars. The DOJ wanted to advance national
desegregation objectives. At the same time, the federal government
may have had the ulterior motive of seeking political support for
President Carter's 1980 reelection campaign.9 1
83 Complaint at 3, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1980).
84 Id
85 Id at 4. On Oct. 17, 1979, the Board specifically denied that it had committed illegal
discriminatory practices. Id at 3. On Oct. 18, 1979, HEW demanded that the Board "sub-
mit. . . an acceptable desegregation plan within ten days." Id at 4. The Board failed to
submit a plan to HEW.
86 Ste id
87 See id at 4. The Department of Education affirmed HEW's decision on June 12, 1980.
Id
88 See Brief for the Board of Educ. of Chicago at 6, United States v. Board of Educ., No.
83-2308, No. 83-2402, No. 83-2445 (7th Cir. 1983).
89 See id
90 See id
91 This suggestion is supported by a shift in Carter administration remedial objectives in
the Chicago case. Zielenziger, Chicago on Collsion Course with U.S. on Desegregation, Washington
Post, Oct. 13, 1979, at A3, col. 1. HEW's Office for Civil Rights reportedly wanted the Chi-
cago school board to agree that mandatory busing would be used if voluntary methods failed
to achieve a pattern of pupil distribution in which no public school could be greater than 50%
white or 65% black. HEW reportedly rejected Superintendent Joseph P. Hannon's "Access to
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On September 14, 1980, the Board and DOJ jointly petitioned
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
to enter the consent decree, 92 and the DOJ filed a complaint charg-
ing the Board with illegal, racially-discriminatory conduct. 93 Judge
Shadur approved the decree the same day.9 4
1. The Consent Decree
Rather than specifying the details of a desegregation plan, the
consent decree outlined general principles that the Board would use
in its attempt "to remedy the present effects of past segregation of
Black and Hispanic students. ' ' 95 For example, instead of defining a
desegregated school or what percentage of the system's schools should
be desegregated, the decree provided only for "the establishment of
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools, con-
sidering all the circumstances in Chicago. ' 96
Yet despite its general language, the consent decree recognized
that the Board had the responsibility of developing a plan falling
within the "broad range of constitutionally acceptable plans.197 Ad-
ditionally, the Board and DOJ agreed that "specific racial ratios in
schools [are not] a necessary remedy in desegregation cases, that ra-
cial and ethnic balance throughout the Chicago School District is
neither practicable nor required, and that no particular definition of
a desegregated school is required."98 As a correlative, the decree
specified that mandatory pupil reassignment and transportation
Excellence" plan because, among other things, it was too vague and relied principally on
voluntary measures.
92 Joint Motion of the United States and the Board of Education for Entry of Consent
Decree, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980).
93 Complaint, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980).
It is common practice for the simultaneous filing of a consent decree and a complaint in a
school desegregation lawsuit. See, e.g., Mirga & Caldwell, US Approves Voluntary Plans to Deseg-
regate, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 1, 1983, at 1.
94 Consent Decree, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1980).
95 Consent Decree at 4, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
24, 1980). The Board, however, did not admit to illegally segregating Chicago's schools. Id.
at 2.
96 Id at 4. In a similar vein, the decree provided that "[t]o the greatest extent practica-
ble, the plan will provide for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups," and that "[t]he
plan shall ensure that the burdens of desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial
or ethnic group." Id at 4-5.
97 Id at 5. The DOJ reasoned that "the Board's familiarity with and sensitivity to the
unique situation presented in Chicago. . .[will enable it] to select from within the constitu-
tional range the plan that best meets the needs of the Chicago School District." Id
98 Id at 5.
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remedies would be used only "to the extent that other techniques are
insufficient."9 9
Voluntary desegregation offers participating students the signifi-
cant benefits of choice. Yet for such a plan to be effective, students
must have sufficient knowledge and incentive to choose to transfer
among schools. Additional money may be needed to inform the
community of various educational opportunities and to make alter-
native schooling options truly worthwhile. In Chicago, for example,
the school board budgeted approximately $300 million to implement
the desegregation plan for two years. 1°°
Local school systems may prefer voluntary techniques in order
to retain their traditional responsibiity for education policy decisions.
This preference is consistent with the "new federalism" in educa-
tion. 10 1 To pass constitutional muster, however, voluntary plans
must effectively desegregate area schools.
Brown's promise of equal educational opportunity was severely
limited by recalcitrant school systems, which implemented voluntary
freedom-of-choice plans. Typically, no white children and very few
black children chose to cross the old racial lines. In 1968, the
Supreme Court invalidated such plans in Green v. Counlty School
Board 0 2 It ruled that previously segregated school systems had an
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to con-
vert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch." 10 3 The Court demanded that school
boards come forward with a plan "that promises realistically to work
now." 10 4 Green did not require mandatory pupil assignments. Yet,
the Court clearly suggested that choice, by itself, would not satisfy
desegregation obligations.
Mandatory busing remedies were first approved by the Supreme
Court in 1971. In Swann v. Charlotle-Mecklenburg County Board of Educa-
tion,10 5 the Court required lower courts to look at the actual effects of
a desegregation plan. Swann recognized the use of white-black pupil
99 Id at 6.
100 As noted in the district court's June 30 ruling, "[f]or school year 1983-84 [the] Board
has budgeted $66.9 million for the implementation of the Plan [and the] Board presently
projects a budget deficit of approximately $200 million for its 1983-84 fiscal year." 567 F.
Supp. at 274.The DOJ disputed these figures.
101 See notes 63-64 supra.
102 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
103 Id at 437-48.
104 Id at 439.
105 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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ratios as "a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy," 0 6 and
that compulsory busing was an appropriate starting point remedy.
The Court acknowledged that in order to eliminate all vestiges of an
unconstitutional dual school system, desegregation remedies may be
"administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre."' 10 7
Swann, however, does not forbid the use of voluntary techniques. In-
stead, Swann's sole demand is that school boards efecivel'y desegregate
area schools.
Recent court-ordered desegregation remedies still emphasize
mandatory pupil reassignments, however. 0 Chicago thus appears
to be the administration's test case'0 9 to see whether the DOJ can
successfully implement its anti-busing policies."l 0
The consent decree's emphasis on expansive Board authority
and its preference for desegregation techniques not involving trans-
portation represents a drastic shift from prior DOJ tactics. The
Carter administration's preference for both an expansive definition
of illegal segregation and area-wide mandatory transportation reme-
dies may be seen in its handling of other cases."' In Columbus Board of
106 Id at 25.
107 Id at 28.
108 In the Nashville desegregation, for example, the court of appeals held that modifica-
tions in desegregation remedies must comport with current black/white student population
ratios, despite the district court's finding that such an approach cannot effectively desegregate
the schools and is educationally unsound. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492
F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Tenn. 1980), rev'd, 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 834
(1983). For a critique of the appellate ruling, see Devins, New Dilemmas and Opportunities in
Integrating Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1984, at 24. For a related case, see Tasby v. Estes,
412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
437 (1980).
109 The significance of Chicago is seen in this colloquy between Assistant Attorney General
Reynolds and then-Congressman Harold Washington at Congressional hearings on
desegregation:
Mr. Washington. You seem to have great confidence in a voluntary student transfer
program. Are you using Chicago as an example of a voluntary program that could
work?
Mr. Reynolds. I think Chicago is a volunteer program that will work. . . . I think
that overall that the plan that is being followed in Chicago is one that people are
very optimistic and positive about, and I think it is working.
School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of House Comm.
on theJudiciay, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 733-54 (1982).
110 See, e.g., Kirp, Busing Politics and Judges, Chicago Trib., Oct. 17, 1982, § 2 at 7.
111 The Carter administration also sought the adoption of an expansive definition of ra-
cial discrimination in the areas of tax-exemption for private schools. In August 1978, the
Carter IRS sought to deny tax-exemption for private schools whose percentage of minority
students was less than 20% of the minority population in the area served by the school. 43
Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). Congress stayed the implementation of these guidelines by passing
riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 94 Stat. 559, 577
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Education v. Penick'1 2 and Dayton Board of Education z. Binkman,"l3 for
example, the Supreme Court accepted the Carter DOJ's argument
that "a pre-1954 substantive violation [of Brown], unremedied by af-
firmative action of the Green/Swann standard [e.g., comprehensive
mandatory pupil reassignment] is the cause of current observed seg-
regation . . . ." That is, a "racially desegregated society exists ab-
sent discriminatory governmental action." 14 The departure in
Chicago from previous Carter administration policies led to accusa-
tions that the Board-DOJ consent decree was a political sell-out
designed to assist the 1980 Carter reelection campaign.115 Ironically,
judicial adoption of these Carter administration views suggested that
the Board's voluntary desegregation plan might raise significant con-
stitutional issues. 16
2. Attempts to Intervene
The consent decree caused a public outcry among national civil
rights groups. Within a week after its entry, the metropolitan Chi-
cago NAACP filed a motion to intervene as a party plaintiff.117 It
called the "[g]overnment's approval. . . a clear, blatant and uncon-
scionable failure to fulfill its duty in this litigation to represent the
rights and interests of black students of the Chicago Public
(1979). For a general discussion of Carter administration efforts to advance the concerns of
civil rights groups in the tax-exemption controversy, see McCoy and Devins, Standing and
Adverseness on the Issue of Tar-Exemptions for Racialy Disciminatoy Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 441 (1984).
112 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
113 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
114 J. BLUMSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DESEGREGATION OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCA-
TION 16-17 (198 1)(V.I.P.P.S. Working Paper). University of Chicago Law Professor Edmund
W. Kitch thought that these decisions spoke to an even broader proposition:
[In Columbus and Dayton] the Court endorses an approach to the 'factual' question
that makes proof of a neighborhood school into proof of racial discrimination. It
then approves a remedy which, by implication, assumes that a neighborhood school
policy, when combined with any significant residential segregation, is
unconstitutional.
Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 6 (1980).
115 Denton, US, Chicago Reach Pact on Desegregation, Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1980, Al,
at col. 6. Thomas I. Atkins, general counsel for the NAACP, referred to the consent decree as
follows: "An elephant labored and produced a mouse . . . . In the absence of substantive
content, . . . the timing becomes suspect." See also Unique Chicago-Justice Desegregation Pact
Approved, Educ. Daily, Sept. 26, 1980, at 1-2.
116 See, e.g., Kirp, supra note 110, at 7 ("The federal courts will likely disapprove of [the
Board plan] . . . to do otherwise would seem to signal abandonment to the judicial commit-
ment to undo the effects of Jim Crow.").
117 See United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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Schools," 1 8 and suggested that the Board's plan offered no promise
of effectively desegregating Chicago's schools, 119 since it considered
white-Hispanic schools to be integrated.
Similar motions to intervene were filed in mid-November by the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 120 The Chicago
Urban League,121 like the NAACP, attacked the Board's inclusive
definition of minority students, a definition which grouped black and
Hispanic students into a single minority classification. The NAACP
and Urban League argued that such a grouping would result in the
plan's failure to address the specific needs of black schoolchildren. 122
The Board and DOJ opposed the motions. 123 On January 6, 1981,
Judge Shadur denied them. 124 The court reasoned:
Intervention at this stage of the proceedings would deflect
the litigation from its essential goal of producing at the earliest
feasible date a desegregated school system for the Chicago public
schools, and more importantly, for the very classes whose rights
the intervenors seek to protect. 125
The court noted that intervenors might attempt to open up the issue
of the Board's liability-an issue whose resolution would take at least
one year. 126 The court accepted as true the DOJ contention that "in
public law litigation, where compliance depends in part on public
acceptance and the least possible acrimony between the parties, set-
tlement is particularly welcome for it signifies cooperation between
the parties."' 127 Finally, the court noted that in cases like this, there
was a presumption that the DOJ would adequately represent the
118 NAACP Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, United States v.
Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1982).
119 See Reply Memoranda of Board of Education in Support of Desegregation Plan at 7,
United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-0-5124 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1982).
120 See id. Interestingly, the groups who opposed the Board's plan were either national
organizations or local chapters of national organizations. These groups were seeking to im-
pose upon the Board the pre-Reagan federal view of school desegregation.
121 See Chicago Urban League, An Assessment of the Chicago Board of Education's De-
segregation Plan (Feb. 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Urban League].
122 The Urban League contended that "traditional minority group status should not be a
sufficient criterion for inclusion with blacks as groups requiring a remedy from past racial
isolation. . . . Rather than white vs. nonwhite, the basic dichotomy in terms of racial segre-
gation in schools has been black vs. nonblack." Id at 1-2.
123 United States v. Board of Educ, 88 F.R.D. 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
124 Id
125 Id at 682.
126 Id The Board never admitted liability at any stage in these proceedings.
127 Id. at 681 (quoting Memorandum of United States requesting entry of consent decree).
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public interest.128 Consequently, Judge Shadur suggested that inter-
venors wait until the Board had developed a plan, at which time the
court could review "any arguable failure to protect [the prospective
intervenors'] interests or inadequacy of representation" by the
DOJ.1 29
The court also stressed an essential difference between a consent
decree settlement and a traditional, court-ordered desegregation
remedy:
Under the Consent Decree the primary responsibility for devel-
oping the plan is on the Board, and. . . [provided the Board plan
is constitutional, this] Court will not superimpose its own views of
what other constitutional means might be preferable ...
Judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal
settlement terms for the judgement of litigants and their
counsel. 130
At the same time, the court maintained that "[i]t has not abdicated
its constitutional responsibilities, and if the litigants were to agree on
a plan that did not conform to the Constitution, this Court would
reject that plan."'' 31 Judge Shadur has stated that his "Court is
neither the intended designer nor the intended czar of the Chicago
school system and its plan of desegregation."' 1 32
3. Advent of the Reagan Administration
Before the Board developed its plan, Ronald Reagan defeated
Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election. The Reagan DOJ's
approach to desegregation generally was at odds with that of the
Carter DOJ. The Chicago consent decree between the Carter DOJ
and the Board, however, paved the way for a major test of the Rea-
gan view. In July 1981, the Department-apparently influenced by
attorneys familiar with the Carter DOJ's understanding of the de-
cree-rejected a proposed set of planning principles developed by the
Board. 33  Later, however, the Department-apparently acting
under new DOJ policies-reversed its position, approving the school
128 See id at 686.
129 Id For a discussion of arguments proffered by the NAACP in its efforts to intervene in
the case subsequent to the Board's filing of a plan, see notes 156, 168, 186-90 infra.
130 Id at 687, quoting Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir.
1980).
131 Id
132 554 F. Supp. at 914.
133 Mirga, Busing Will Not Help to Desegregate Chicago Schools, Federal Judge Rules, EDUC.
WEEK, Jan. 19, 1983, at 9.
[Vol. 59:1243]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
system's adoption of a voluntary strategy.' 34
The Reagan DOJ categorically opposes mandatory pupil trans-
portation remedies.1 35 Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
William Bradford Reynolds has expressed concern that mandatory
pupil transportation remedies "are threatening to dilute the essential
(national) consensus that racial discrimination is wrong and should
not be tolerated in any form,"' 136 and that involuntary busing "has
failed to advance the overriding goal of equal educational opportu-
nity."' 37 He suggested that "[a]dherence to an experiment [such as
busing] which has not withstood the test of experience obviously
makes little sense." 138 Instead of mandatory pupil transportation,
DOJ now advances a remedial strategy program which includes
"voluntary student assignment program[s], magnet schools, and en-
hanced curriculum requirements, faculty incentives, inservice train-
ing programs for teachers and administrators, school closings, if
[there is] excess capacity, or new construction."' 139
134 Id
135 The Reagan DOJ-in determining whether it should initiate a school desegregation
lawsuit-also refuses to make use of the so-called Keyes presumption that proof of intentional
segregation in a significant portion of a school district infers that there was intentional segre-
gation in other racially imbalanced portions of the district. See Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). This presumption was based on the Court's recognition
of the difficulty of proving intentional segregation in northern and western school systems
where segregation had not been mandated by state laws. The Supreme Court had devised
the Keyes presumption because it felt that "common sense dictates the conclusion that racially
inspired school board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools that are subjects
of those actions." 413 U.S. at 203. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds
offered the following rationale for DOJ's refusal to use Keyes in its decision to initiate litiga-
tion: "To avoid imposition of a systemwide desegregation plan, which often includes sys-
temwide busing, a school board subject to the Keyes presumption must shoulder the difficult
burden of proving that racial imbalance in schools elsewhere in the system is not attributable
to school authorities." School Desegregation.- Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on theJuuiciag, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 617 (1982) (Testimony of Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds) [hereinafter cited as Testimony].
136 Speech before the Delaware Bar Ass'n, at 9 (Feb., 1982). Mr. Reynolds also remarked
on that occasion:
The flight from urban public schools has eroded the tax base of many cities, which
has in turn contributed to the growing inability of many school systems to provide
high-quality education to their students-whether black or white. Similarly, the
loss of parental support and involvement has robbed many public school systems of
a critical component of successful educational programs. When one adds to these
realities the growing empirical evidence that racially balanced public schools have
failed to improve the educational achievement of the students, the case for
mandatory busing collapses.
137 Testimony, supra note 135, at 618.
138 Id
139 Id at 631.
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B. The District Court Upholds the Board's Proposed Plan
On January 22, 1982, the Board filed a proposed desegregation
plan 140 which did not include any mandatory pupil reassignments.
On February 11, 1982, the DOJ expressed its approval of the Board's
voluntary plan.14
The plan rested on the Board's policy strongly favoring volun-
tary means of desegregation:
The Board has determined, based both on its experience and
careful analysis, that desegregation techniques which are not
compulsory on children are the most effective and most practica-
ble in achieving stable desegregation. Voluntary methods em-
phasize education. They provide to all children and their
families the opportunity to attend a school because they believe
that educational opportunities will result. These affirmative
choices not only enhance desegregation, but do so in a positive
manner which is supportive of the educational objectives of the
school system. Therefore, they are the techniques which are the
most likely to produce both stable desegregation and educational
enrichment. 142
The Board alleged that it was "more important to increase the
number of children in desegregated schools than to try to cause indi-
vidual schools to conform to some preconceived racial composi-
tion."'1 4 3 It claimed that its primary objective was to create "stable"
desegregated schools. 14
There was extensive racial imbalance in the Chicago schools
before the Board's plan. In 1980, 370 out of 584 public schools had
minority populations of over eighty-five percent, while ninety-seven
schools had minority populations under thirty-five percent. 145 The
Board, rather than trying to spread the seventeen percent white pop-
ulation throughout the system, established a goal of at least thirty-
five percent minority enrollment in the ninety-seven predominantly
white schools. 146 The Board also sought to desegregate some
predominantly minority schools by turning twenty-nine of them into
140 Memorandum in Support of Board of Education's School Desegregation Plan, United
States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1982).
141 The United States' Assessment of the Chicago School Board's Comprehensive Student
Assignment Plan, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1982).
142 United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
143 Memorandum, supra note 140, at 14.
144 Id at 15.
145 Id at 25.
146 Id The Board contended "that predominantly minority schools (unlike predomi-
nantly white schools) cannot all attain the definition of desegregated schools." 554 F. Supp.
at 918; see notes 172-80 infia.
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specialized magnet schools. 47 Since white student enrollment had
been declining steadily as white families moved to the suburbs,' 48
"[t]he Board concluded that the desegregation techniques which
would be most successful . . . would either be techniques which
would continue children in nearby schools . . . or . . . which en-
courage but do not compel children to attend schools where their
enrollment will be desegregative in nature."'149 The plan identified
three categories of naturally "integrated schools,"' 50 whose stability
the Board sought to preserve by limiting voluntary transfers. Be-
cause of Chicago's racially segregated housing patterns, most of these
schools were composed of white and Hispanic students.'-51
In approving the Board's plan, the DOJ recognized that
[t]he plan is premised on the belief. . . that there is a substantial
number of parents who want to have their children enroll in inte-
grated schools in this manner and the belief is that a thorough
recruitment and publicity campaign . . . can reduce racial and
ethnic isolation in Chicago's public schools to the greatest extent
practicable.' 52
The DOJ agreed with the Board that "voluntary transfers can be
more effective for black students because they historically have been
more responsive to this technique than have other minority stu-
dents."' 53 It cited with approval a Board-funded survey of parents'
attitudes that indicated that desegregation could be accomplished
through the Board's proposed techniques.' 54 Finally, the DOJ con-
cluded that the plan "creates a careful balance between the concepts
of 'maintaining stability' and the right of minority students to
147 Memorandum, supra note 140, at 31.
148 Id at 16.
149 Id. at 17.
150 The district court described these categories as follows: (1) " 'stably integrated
schools', which because they are now and are projected to remain naturally integrated [30%
white and 30% minority minimum representation], . . . are subjected to some limits on vol-
untary transfers;" (2) "schools now 'stably integrated' but with projected racial changes that
would threaten that status-here various techniques. . . are adopted to preserve their present
stability" and (3) "'stable mixed schools' (having 15-30% present and projected white enroll-
ment), as to which various techniques. . . are intended to maintain or increase current levels
of integration." 554 F. Supp. at 917.
151 See 554 F. Supp. at 922 ("there is more natural integration of white and Hispanic
children"), and notes 167-72 infra.
152 Assessment, supra note 141, at 4.
153 Id. at 17.
154 Id at 19-22. Despite this approval, the United States recognized "that the overall
results of voluntary programs in Chicago have been disappointing in past years." Id at 30.
For a discussion of minority group comments concerning past voluntary programs, see notes
181-87 infra.
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transfer."'155
1. Constitutional Arguments Against the Board's Plan
The court ruled in the Board's favor on several constitutional
objections raised by the NAACP. The first concerned the standard
for integrated schools. The plan defined a school as "integrated" or
"desegregated" if it had at least thirty percent minority and thirty
percent white students. Consequently, although the Chicago system
was only seventeen percent white, schools which were seventy per-
cent white would be considered desegregated. In practice, because of
the sparcity of white students, "[a]fter two years of implementation
[of the Chicago plan], 8,500 students remained in all-minority ele-
mentary schools, compared to 10,131 when implementation be-
gan." I5 6 The court15 7 nevertheless concluded that the thirty percent
majority/minority standard was in accord with school desegregation
decisions in Milwaukee, 58 St. Louis, 159 Atlanta, 60 Dallas,' 6' and
Washington, D.C.162 Yet school desegregation decisions in Colum-
bus, 63 Dayton, 64 Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 65 Nashville, 66 and sev-
eral other cities had required that strict attention be paid to black-
white student population ratios.
Second, the court validated the plan's grouping of both blacks
and Hispanics into a single "minority students" category. The Board
argued that it was appropriate "to seek the desegregation of white
155 Assessment, supra note 141, at 24.
156 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 15. But see Reply Memorandum, supra note 119, at
35-41.
157 The Court, however, did suggest that the Board was sincere in its effort to desegregate
Chicago schools. See, e.g., 554 F. Supp. at 919-20 ("It is the Board's stated intention to con-
tinue to push for integration .... Nor is that just a paper commitment; it is real.").
158 Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 311 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980).
159 Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 & n.30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
826 (1980).
160 Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1973), afdfo owing remand,
522 F. 2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975).
161 Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But see Tasby v. Estes, 412
F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 572 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
437 (1980).
162 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 411 n.9 (D.D.C. 1967), ad sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
163 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); see note 114 supra.
164 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 536 (1979); see note 114 supra.
165 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see notes
105-07 supra.
166 Kelly v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), rev'd, 687
F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
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children from all groups of minority youngsters."1 67 Speaking for the
other side, the NAACP suggested that because of the inclusive defini-
tion, "Chicago, a system which is 60% black, [will have] no more
than 10% black students. . . [participating] now, or in the future, in
a 'system wide' desegregation plan, purportedly designed, inter a/ia, to
remedy the present effects of segregation of black students."' 6 In
sum, the NAACP contended that the Board's plan did not meet the
Green v. County School Board requirement that school boards come for-
ward with a plan "that promises realistically to work now."' 69 The
court upheld the Board, reasoning that "courts that have dealt with
desegregation issues in multi-ethnic school districts have consistently
approved plans with an inclusive definition of minorities like that
adopted by the plan."1 70 At the same time, the court noted that
"there is a good deal to be said in policy terms on the other side of
the issue."'171 It acknowledged that "[i]n the practical sense, . . .
schools with (say) 65% white and 35% hispanic students [could be]
counted as 'desegregated,' even though [they] contain . . . no mem-
bers of the black population that itself makes up 60% of the entire
school system."' 72
Third, the court ruled that the racial composition of Chicago's
schools made desegregation of all minority schools unfeasible.173 In-
stead, the court agreed with the Board's contention that desegre-
gating all primarily white schools would result in the greatest
number of stably desegregated schools. 174 The court based its deci-
sion on the proposition of Miliken v. Brad,' 75 "that the continued
existence of one-race schools [does not] pose the kind of clear uncon-
stitutionality requiring disapproval of a desegregation plan." 76 Mil-
liken narrowly held that desegregation "does not require any
particular racial balance in each school, grade, or classroom."' 177 But
Milliken did not involve a desegregation plan, such as Chicago's,
167 Memorandum, supra note 119, at 47.
168 Id. at 30.
169 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). According to the NAACP, "[w]here it cannot be shown that
allowing free choice or free transfer would not further delay student desegregation, such tech-
niques are constitutionally unacceptable." Memorandum, supra note 118, at 31.
170 554 F. Supp. at 921. For a list of references, see id at 921 n.11.
171 Id at 921.
172 Id. at 920-21; see notes 145, 151 supra.
173 554 F. Supp. at 923 ("In a largely minority school system like Chicago's,. . it is not
feasible to desegregate all the primarily minority schools ....
174 Reply Memorandum, supra note 119, at 42.
175 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
176 554 F. Supp. at 923 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-741 (1974)).
177 418 U.S. at 740-41.
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which would not alter the racial composition of most predominatly
black schools. 178 In fact, in 1977 the Supreme Court affirmed a Sixth
Circuit ruling in a related case, Bradley v. Milliken,179 that rejected as
erroneous the Detroit school board's argument that "mere elimina-
tion of identifiably white schools satisfied the criteria of Brown." 1' 80
The last substantive issue resolved by the district court in Chi-
cago concerned the plan's failure to use mandatory pupil reassign-
ment techniques. To support its premise that "[t]he use of
desegregative techniques other than compulsory transportation will
produce the maximum feasible degree of stable desegregation,"'181
the Board expressed its general preference for neighborhood schools
and "pointed to the results of a NORC182 survey which indicated
that a mandatory busing program would accelerate the decline of
white enrollment in the system."' 8 3 Accepting the Board's estimate
of the likely effect of mandatory busing, and recognizing the Board's
broad authority under the consent decree, the district court approved
the Board's approach. 8 4 It found that "[u]nder the circumstances
here the Board cannot be faulted in constitutional terms for not hav-
ing ventured needlessly onto that battlefield."'' 85
The NAACP and Urban League strongly differed with the
court's ruling on mandatory reassignments. Both groups noted that
"there is a long track record in Chicago establishing the ineffective-
ness of voluntary free choice techniques to make any meaningful im-
pact in reducing the severe racial isolation in the district's
schools."' 18 6 They argued that
the plan contains an unstated assumption on which many of the
plan's features depend-namely-that the danger of white flight
is so imminent and would be so destructive that it is the overrid-
ing consideration to be avoided at all costs. The extreme pre-
eminence accorded this viewpoint is racist and thus
178 See notes 145-46, 148, and 167 supra.
179 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), afd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
180 540 F.2d at 139; see also Memorandum, note 118, at 15-17.
181 554 F. Supp. at 924 (quoting plan at 271).
182 National Opinion Research Center.
183 554 F. Supp. at 924.
184 The DOJ Assessment approaches this issue in a similar manner. See Assessment, supra
note 141, at 13-14, 19-22. The district court noted, howeyer, that "[t]his opinion reserves
judgment on the propriety of these limitations. [For the future may]. . . demonstrate. . . a
need for mandatory busing...." 554 F. Supp. at 924 n.12.
185 554 F. Supp. at 926.
186 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 33-35; see also Chicago Urban League, supra note 121,
at 35-37. The Board, however, argued that problems of design, implementation, and finance
were the cause of problems in the earlier plan. See Brief, supra note 88, at 30-33.
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unconstitutional. 187
These comments are in accord with other courts' reasoning in deseg-
regation decisions. 88 In Nashville, 8 9 for example, the Sixth Circuit
virtually ignored the district court's findings as to the ineffectiveness
of the busing remedy and ordered county-wide busing. Another al-
leged flaw in the plan that the NAACP especially noted was its fail-
ure to focus on the racial isolation of black schoolchildren:
[W]ith very few exceptions, no black or other minority student
not now in, what the Board considers a desegregated or inte-
grated school, will be provided an integrated education unless he
or she transfers to a white receiving school or a magnet or metro-
politan school/scholastic academy. Conversely, eveg white child
in the district is guaranteed to receive an integrated education
without having to leave his/her neighborhood school.' 90
2. Assessment of the Court's Ruling
It is difficult to assess whether the Chicago court acted impr6p-
erly in denying the NAACP's motion to intervene or in upholding
the Board's plan. The plan offered the advantages of being both po-
litically popular and a quick response to the problem of racial imbal-
ance in Chicago schools. Additionally, there exists a judicial
presumption that the government will adequately represent the
"public interest." Finally, since the consent decree was contractual
in nature, it was to be expected that the Board would have discretion
to develop a plan within the broad parameters of the decree and the
Constitution. Correlative to this, a consent decree need only provide
for a constitutionally acceptable remedy. On the other hand, the
plan's failure to set goals of acceptable levels of desegregation, com-
bined with its conclusive definition of minority students, is problem-
atic given the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown that school systems
have an "affirmative duty" to come forward with a plan "that
promises realistically to work now."
The Reagan administration found the court's decision "ex-
tremely encouraging."' 9 ' "The court found the plan to be clearly
within the broad range of constitutionaly acceptable remedies," com-
mented William Bradford Reynolds, the assistant attorney general
187 Urban League, supra note 121, at 49; see also Memorandum, supra note 118, at 19.
188 See Memorandum, supra note 118, at 19; notes 152-55 supra.
189 Kelly v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Devins, School
Desegregation Law in the 1980s, 1984 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1.
190 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 46.
191 Mirga, supra note 133, at 9.
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for civil rights.' 92 "We remain confident that the proper implemen-
tation of this plan, which is based mainly on magnet schools and
voluntary transfers, can achieve more lasting desegregation than a
mandatory student reassignment plan."' 93
The court's approval of the plan is a breakthrough for the Rea-
gan DOJ. It allows the administration to pursue its antibusing poli-
cies by entering into similar consent decrees with school districts
subject to desegregation obligations. 94 The Chicago decision also
supports administration moves to give state and local education sys-
tems greater authority. 95
Chicago, through its recognition of the Board's expansive power
under the consent decree, suggests that the executive can vest sub-
stantial authority in state and local school systems to monitor their
own desegregation activities. Although such "divestiture" represents
a dramatic shift from the pre-Reagan enforcement of federal civil
rights statutes and equal protection clause guarantees, responsible ju-
dicial supervision of local school desegregation efforts can ensure that
school systems satisfy the terms of constitutionally acceptable consent
decrees. The Chicago case may foster this. Chicago also demonstrated
that the scope of a desegregation order may be defined by the parties
involved in the lawsuit and not the preferences of outside interest
groups. The DOJ agreed to the plan, and the court, by denying sev-
eral motions to intervene, refused to allow minority groups to raise
their constitutional objections to the plan directly. 96
III. The Chicago Board of Education Sues to Obtain Federal
Financial Assistance
The district court's approval did not end litigation over the Chi-
cago desegregation plan. Even after the DOJ "praised the Board's
implementation of the Plan as 'excellent' and 'in good faith' . .. ,
and the District Court has found that the Board's efforts to meet its
obligations under the Consent Decree [to be] in good faith,"'197 the
192 Id
193 Id
194 This has already happened in Bakersfield, California, and Lima, Ohio. See Mirga &
Caldwell, supra note 93, at 1.
195 See notes 63-64 supra.
196 Since the district court upheld the plan as constitutional, it is unlikely that future
efforts to intervene or collateral attacks can be successfully maintained. In fact, in a related
action, the district court denied a motion to intervene in Chicago for precisely this reason.
Johnson v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
197 Brief, supra note 88, at 2.
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issue remained of who should fund the plan. Section 15.1 of the con-
sent decree provided that "[e]ach party is obligated to make every
good faith effort to find and provide every available form of financial
resources adequate for the implementation of the desegregation
plan."198 Whether this provision requires the federal government to
provide special desegregation assistance to Chicago is presently the
subject of litigation in United States v. Board of Education'99 ("Chicago
II").
On June 30, 1983, Judge Shadur ruled that the decree obligated
the United States to provide assistance. 200 To reinforce his order,
Judge Shadur froze approximately $250 million of federal education
funds.20 1 Because of the district court's ruling, Congress had allo-
cated-over executive objection- 20 2 $20 million dollars to the Chi-
cago school system. 20 3 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on September
9, 1983.204
A. The "New Federalism" and Chicago II
Chicago II raises several issues significant to understanding the
effects of the "new federalism." First, federal expenditures under the
current block grant do not appear to provide sufficient support for
expansive desegregation remedies.20 5 Second, effective voluntary de-
segregation techniques-although not involving the cost of busing-
may be more expensive than mandatory ones.20 6 Third, the "new
federalism" did not provide for transitional assistance to school dis-
tricts which had relied on ESAA and similar programs to ensure ade-
quate funding for their desegregation plans. 20 7 Finally, proponents
of the "new federalism" focus on reducing federal involvement in lo-
cal educational decisionmaking; albeit an important concern, it is
one that may limit federal action on behalf of minority students. 20 8
198 Consent Decree, supra note 95, at 12, § 15.1.
199 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill.), afd, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983).
200 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
201 Id. at 285-90.
202 See notes 256-58 infia.
203 See notes 250-262 infra.
204 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). On August 13, 1984, the district court entered a judg-
ment for $103.858 million against the United States. Order, United States v. Board of Educ.,
No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1984).
205 See notes 72-75 supra.
206 The costs for voluntary desegregation using magnet schools may be substantial and
may in some instances surpass those of mandatory assignment plans. Caldwell, Magnet
Schools: The New Hopefor Voluntary Desegregation, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 29, 1984, at 1, 15-16.
207 See notes 72-75 supra.
208 See notes 63-64 supra. But see note 5 supra.
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In its appeal brief, the Board contended that the government
had "entered into a consent decree by which it agreed, . . . under
judicial supervision, to be mutually responsible with a school board
for funding a desegregation plan." 20 9 The Board felt that this obliga-
tion amounted to a specific commitment to Chicago, not merely a
general obligation that permitted Chicago to compete with other
school districts for congressionally-authorized education funds. The
DOJ disagreed, and claimed that the consent decree "does not re-
quire the Executive Branch. . . to prefer Chicago over other school
districts . . . in dispensing federal financial assistance and structur-
ing federal assistance programs. ' 210 On May 31, 1983, the Board
petitioned for an order directing the United States to comply with
Section 15.1 of the decree.21' The cases required the court to deter-
mine what constitutes a "good faith effort" by the government, and
which funds were "available" for Chicago school desegregation.
A primary cause of the funding dispute in Chicago was the sub-
stantial reduction in federal desegregation assistance resulting from
the "new federalism" in education as it was partially translated into
legislation.2 1 2 According to the Board:
Since federal fiscal year 1981, the Executive Branch has been en-
gaged in a continuous effort to strip away all means by which it
could fulfill the United States' obligations under the Consent De-
cree. Despite the continued availability of financial resources
[still available to the Secretary of Education], the Executive
Branch has provided virtually no direct financial support for the
Board's desegregation efforts. 213
The Board cited the administration's failure to support desegregation
efforts or make a special effort to use available funds, noting that
President Reagan vetoed legislation designed specifically to assist
Chicago.214 It further suggested that the administration was openly
hostile to its efforts to secure federal desegregation assistance.
209 Brief, supra note 88, at 1.
210 Brief for the United States at 16, United States v. Board of Educ., Nos. 83-2308, 83-
2402,83-2445 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 1983). The Board requested both declaratory and injunctive
relief.
211 See 717 F.2d at 380. (Specifically, "The Board asked the district court.").
212 See notes 256-58 infra; see also notes 72-73 and 110 supra.
213 Brief, supra note 88, at 10. The Board also noted both its compliance with the consent
decree and its need for financial support. The Board contended that "[uln a period of severe
financial constraint, desegregation implementation has been the only programmatic area in
which the Board has continually increased its annual level of expenditure. . . . In spite of
the Board's efforts, however, it does not have financial resources adequate for full implemen-
tation of the Plan." Id at 8.
214 Id at 10-11; see note 250 infra.
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The Board's failures in working with the federal government led
to the filing of Chicago II. The first issue the coutt addressed required
it to determine, from the decree's "four corners," 21-5 the parties' intent
in Section 15.1216
The district court unequivocally held that the United States had
an affirmative obligation to assist the Board's efforts to secure federal
funding. It found that "the United States' promise to make every
good faith effort" to find and provide available funds entailed a "se-
rious and substantial obligation. 21 7 The court further noted that
this obligation required consistency in federal policy; the government
"could not in good faith, having entered into the Consent Decree,
work actively to make financial resources unavailable. 21
In its appeal, the DOJ vigorously challenged these rulings. It
alleged that the court improperly read Section 15.1 as (1) a guaran-
tee of federal financial support,2 19 (2) "an open-ended commitment
to provide federal assistance, '220 and (3) a limitation on the range
within which the executive branch would determine national educa-
tional policy and related legislative proposals.221
The Board, in turn, suggested that the government misinter-
preted both the consent decree and the district court's order. It
viewed Section 15.1 as "a substantial affirmative promise. '222 The
215 567 F. Supp. at 281.
216 The case did not raise the issue of the enforceability of consent decrees. The court
simply stated: "Consent decrees are binding orders that have the same force as any other
judgment. Accordingly, the Consent Decree is fully enforceable by this court." 567 F. Supp.
at 281.
217 Id at 283.
218 Id at 282.
219 See Brief, supra note 210, at 17, 36. For example, in Fox v. Dep't. of Housing and
Urban Development, 680 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit interpreted a consent
decree in which HUD agreed to use its best efforts to obtain necessary federal approvals for
construction of a specific housing project to be built according to the terms of the decree. The
Third Circuit held that this "best efforts" clause was not an "undertaking by HUD, express or
implied, to provide. . . financing." Id at 320; see also cases cited in Brief, supra note 210, at
18.
220 Brief, supra note 210, at 17.
221 See Brief, supra note 88, at 20, 47.
222 Id at 19. In support of this contention the Board referred to Brewster v. Dukakis, 675
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Best efforts" obligation includes appeal to legislature for appropria-
tion of funding.); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 837 (D. Mass 1982) ("Best efforts" implies
"all steps within their lawful authority."); Geiser v. United States, 627 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.
1980) ("Best efforts" entails a serious affirmative obligation.).
As to the meaning of the Consent Decree, the Board argued:
On its face, § 15.1 of the Consent Decree plainly creates a mutual obligation of
the parties to do everything possible to provide financing to assure the success of the
Plan. The word "find" describes an obligation to identify and procure potential
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"new federalism" in education, which resulted in the elimination of
ESAA and other programs, consequently was seen by the Board as a
breach of the government's "substantial affirmative promise. '223
The Board further pointed to government memoranda interpreting
Section 15.1 which said that "each party is obligated to search for
every available means to provide adequate financial resources for the
implementation of the Desegregation Plan, '224 and that the Board
should "receive the maximum amount of financial and technical
assistance that this Department [of Education] can provide. '225
The Board's contention, that the federal government had obli-
gated itself to provide funding to implement the desegregation
plan,226 raises the second significant factual issue in Chicago II:
whether the Department of Education had ready access to funds
which could help support Chicago school desegregation. In af-
firming the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit placed great
emphasis on these questions of fact. It first noted that Section 15.1
was written in language so broad as to be ambiguous.2 27 Conse-
quently, it based its determination on extrinsic evidence introduced
by the Board and DOJ. The Seventh Circuit found persuasive gov-
ernment memoranda-introduced by the Board-that suggested
that Chicago receive the maximum amount of desegregation assist-
ance available to the Department of Education.2 8
Based on this determination, the appellate court next had to
means of funding. "Provide" obviously means to give such funding to the Board.
"Every available" refers to funds that are or might be made subject to a party's
control. "Adequate for implementation of the Plan" serves to limit the parties' obli-
gations to amounts necessary to carry out the Plan. This language of § 15.1 is of
course preceded by the phrase "every good faith effort" which, while not a guaran-
tee, clearly requires a most serious and substantial effort to attain the result de-
scribed in the provision.
Brief, supra note 88, at 17.
223 See notes 63-75 supra for a discussion of Reagan administration programs.
224 See Brief, upra note 88, at 25.
225 Id
226 The School Board alleged that:
Only after applying § 15.1 to the current facts of this case and determining that at
least $15 million is currently available to the Executive Branch which could be pro-
vided to the Board, and that at least $14.6 million is needed for adequate implemen-
tation of the Plan which cannot be provided by the Board despite its good faith
efforts, did the District Court conclude that the United States is obligated to provide
funding of at least $14.6 million for the current year.
Brief, supra note 88, at 15.
227 "[A]side from the board language that permeates all of 15.1 the word 'available' is
capable of more than one meaning." 717 F.2d at 382.
228 Ste id at 383; see also notes 224-25 supra.
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reach the issue of whether the government had acted in good faith.
The district court had held that the government had breached its
obligation on two grounds. First, the "new federalism" violated the
consent decree's "good faith" requirement (since these policies re-
duced the amount of federal funds provided to local educational
agencies for desegregation expenses),229 and second, the government
breached its "good faith" obligation by failing to direct available
funds to the Board.23 0 On the first ground, the Seventh Circuit re-
marked that "a significant constitutional issue may exist as to
whether a finding of lack of good faith properly can be based upon
such a series of sweeping Executive policy decisions and recommen-
dations. ' 231 It did not reach that question, however. 232 Instead, it
affirmed the district court's rulings on the more limited ground that
the Department of Education could have directed more funds to Chi-
cago school desegregation.23 3
The DOJ contended before the appellate court both that ade-
quate funds were available to the Board and that no other sources
were available to finance Chicago school desegregation. It stressed
that "[i]n fiscal year 1982, the Board received $6.3 million under
229 See 567 F. Supp. at 283; see also 717 F.2d at 383.
230 See 567 F. Supp. at 284-85; see also 717 F.2d at 383.
231 717 F.2d at 383. In its brief, the United States suggested that "[t]he district court's
error in interpreting the decree is magnified by its order denying essential funding to grantees
selected by Congress or the Executive and simultaneously seeking a reversal of Congressional
and Executive discretionary decisions." Brief, supra note 210, at 47. In support of this conten-
tion, the United States cited Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In that case, the Supreme Court held that courts
should defer to the policy choices made by executive officials in carrying out their statutory
directives "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances." Id at
543. The United States also questioned the scope of the district court remedy as an abuse of
discretion. See text accompanying note 221 supra.
In seeking to refute this claim, the Board contended that:
The basic purpose of the separation of powers doctrine, to serve as a check against
oppression and prevent the accumulation of power in one branch of government,
would certainly not be served by permitting the Executive Branch to negotiate and
enter an agreement, in which it undertook to "make every good faith effort" to
provide financing for the Plan, and then render its promise meaningless through
later "discretionary" actions.
Brief, supra note 88, at 44.
The Board further noted that the Executive was not forced either to violate congressional
restrictions on education funds or introduce legislation to provide money for the Plan. See id
at 38-39. The United States argued that this Board claim was in error. See Brief, supra note
210, at 38-45. The district and appellate courts both resolved this issue in favor of the Board,
however. See notes 237-46 infra.
232 717 F.2d at 383 ("That important question, however, need not be addressed at this
time, in light of this court's direction regarding the remedies.
233 Id
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Chapter 2 of ECIA, almost double what it had received in the ante-
cedent programs to Chapter 2. All of those funds are, by statute,
available for desegregation expenses at the Board's discretion. '234
The DOJ further noted that in FY 1983 more than ten million addi-
tional dollars were potentially available to the Board for its desegre-
gation program than in 1982.235 Finally, it argued that "many of the
expenses designated by the Board as desegregation expenses would
be incurred regardless of whether the Board was implementing its
plan."
2 3 6
The Board sought to refute these arguments by noting that it
would have been eligible for the same amount of desegregation assist-
ance had it not entered into the consent decree or implemented a
desegregation plan.2 37 The Board implied that it never would have
"agree[d] to develop and implement a costly plan . . . in exchange
for money it already had. '238 The district court agreed with the
Board and held that the "Board cannot obtain adequate financing
for full implementation of the Plan without receiving financial help
from other sources, including the United States. ' 239
In addition to claiming that it had adequately funded Chicago
school desegregation, the DOJ argued that no additional funds were
available to assist Chicago. It suggested that statutory and regula-
tory guidelines prohibited additional expenditures on Chicago school
desegregation. 240 The district court, following the Board's analysis of
234 Reply Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Board of Educ., Nos. 83-2308,
83-2402, 83-2445, (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 1983). School boards, however, generally do not spend
these funds on desegregation related activities. Another analysis reached a different conclu-
sion concerning Chicago's funding experience under the block grant. See note 277 infra.
235 See Brief, supra note 210, at 12-13.
236 Reply Brief, supra note 234, at 14. The government noted: "For example, the Board
considers rehabilitation of school buildings in racially isolated areas a desegregation cost even
though it would admittedly have to undertake such repairs in any event." Id
237 Brief, supra note 88, at 32.
238 Id Yet before the Board entered into the consent decree, it was ineligible to receive
funds specifically designated for desegregation-related activities. See notes 3-12 supra.
239 567 F. Supp. at 283.
240 See Brief, supra note 210, at 38-46. The Government's brief specified limitations on
several aid programs identified by the district court and school board: (1) Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (training and advisory services) where the government claimed that
"[i]n order to permit the Board to receive any substantial award under Title IV this year, the
current competition for State educational agency awards would have to be overturned, and
the Department of Education would have to cancel its commitment to make continuation
awards for desegregation assistance centers." Brief, supra note 210, at 39; (2) ECIA Chapter 2
where the government argued that "[tlhe Secretary of Education has no authority granted by
the statute or regulation to direct the states' allocation of Chapter 2 funds to local education
agencies." Id at 42; (3) ECIA-Discretionary Funds where the government alleged that "any
grant made to the Board would have to fund costs other than general operating costs incurred
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the relevant statutes and regulations, 241 had found that "[flunds are
currently available in the Discretionary Fund and in the Special Pro-
grams and Populations Fund, in amounts exceeding $15 million, that
could be provided by the Secretary of Education to the Board for
desegregation assistance. '242
The district court had granted the Board's request for the $14.6
million in federal aid which the Board claimed was required "for full
implementation" of its costly, voluntary desegregation plan.2 43  The
court found that the Secretary of Education had access to approxi-
mately $35 million in unobligated Title IV and discretionary
funds.24 Based on these rulings, it "directed the United States to
undertake an affirmative program of making every good faith effort
to find and provide the $14.6 million and such other funding as the
court may determine. '245
in implementing the desegregation plan." Id at 44; and (4) the government claimed that a
variety of regulations would make impracticable the reprogramming of "[flunds appropriated
for Women's Educational Equity, Follow Through, Aid to the Virgin Islands, and Territorial
Teacher Training. . . ." Id at 45.
241 See Brief, supra note 88, at 34-38. The Board directly challenged each of those DOJ
contentions. Specifically, it suggested that the Secretary of Education has authority to read-
just specific program allocations. According to the Board,
Congress provides funds to the Department of Education through lump sum appro-
priations to various budget (or appropriation) accounts. Each account encompasses
several programs administered by the Department of Education and operates as the
Department's conduit for distributing funds to its various programs. . . . The pro-
grams which compromise SPP [Special Programs and Populations Appropriation,
which was the primary source available to the United States] include Title IV, the
Secretary's Discretionary Fund, the Ellender Fellowship, Woman's Educational Eq-
uity, and the Follow Through Program ...
Brief, supra note 88, at 35 n.*.
242 567 F. Supp. at 286.
243 Brief, supra note 88, at 8.
244 See 567 F. Supp. at 276, 278.
245 717 F.2d at 383. The appellate court further described the exact contours of the dis-
trict court opinion:
This affirmative program is to include, to the extent necessary to meet the obliga-
tions of the United States: (1) efforts to provide the Board with funds that remain
available for local desegregation assistance and that are located in the Secretary of
Education's Discretionary Fund and the Special Programs and Populations Ac-
count (which included Title IV monies); (2) efforts to secure congressional consent
for the reallocation of excess funds from the Department's Guaranteed Student
Loan Program into a fund from which support may be provided to implement the
Board's desegregation plan; (3) efforts to identify other available monies or to
reprogram or reallocate others excess monies; (4) support of legislative initiatives
that would provide desegregation funding to school districts that have entered into
consent decrees; (5) efforts to fund grantees and projects, which the Department had
intended to fund through the Discretionary Fund and the Special Programs and
Populations Account, with monies from other sources; and (6) cooperation with the
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The Seventh Circuit, although agreeing that the government
had breached its good faith obligation, vacated most of the district
court's affirmative program. It felt that "it is not clear from the rec-
ord before us that the United States had an adequate opportunity to
challenge the remedies selected by the district court, particularly the
$14.6 million figure," 246 and to have additional hearings to deter-
mine the proper level of government funding. 247 In addition, it
found that the lower court had acted too hastily:
The district court acted with excessive dispatch in delineating
specific remedies immmediately after finding a violation of Sec-
tion 15.1. Where another branch of government is found to be in
violation of a court order, courts have shown a preference for al-
lowing that branch to come into compliance voluntarily before
imposing specific remedial measures. 248
But to ensure adequate relief for the Board, the Seventh Circuit up-
held the injunction against spending unobligated funds.249
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Chicago II was quite narrow.
Board to identify the Board's desegregation activities that are eligible for funding
under Title IV.
In its order of June 30, the district court also enjoined the United States from
spending or taking action to obligate funds that are available for providing desegre-
gation funding to the Board and that are located both in the Secretary of Educa-
tion's Discretionary Fund and in the Department's Special Programs and
Populations Account. (citations omitted). In addition, the June 30 order directed
the United States to undertake an affirmative program to preserve the availability
of excess funds (including student loan funds) in the amount of $250 million that
potentially can be used by the United States to fulfill its obligations under the De-
cree for the next five years.
Id at 382-84.
246 Id at 385.
247 See id
248 Id at 384. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977)(district court in-
junction designed to compel state to provide additional financing for hospitals vacated so as
to permit the legislature to provide the financing on its own initiative); Phem v. Malkom, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (similar injunction vacated to allow New York City either to submit a
remedial plan or at least offer suggestions for a judicial remedy).
The appellate court's conclusion on this issue seems particularly appropriate in light of
the broad sweep of the district court remedy. With its $14.6 million order and $250 million
freeze, the district court remedy substantially impacted on several other education programs.
In its brief, the government noted:
The district court's order goes so far as to hold hostage funds appropriated by Con-
gress for very specific purposes-(Aid to the Virgin Islands, Women's Educational
Equity, etc.) having no relationship to desegregation assistance. This action effec-
tively extinguishes the rights and expectations of hundreds of grantees and benefi-
ciaries under these programs, none of whom were a party to these proceedings.
Brief, supra note 210, at 49; see also note 254 infia.
249 717 F.2d at 385.
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The court limited itself to issues of fact, not legal principles. It con-
curred with the district court's finding that the government had an
affirmative obligation to provide available funds to the Board, and
that the Secretary of Education had access to additional monies
which he could have directed to the Board. More interesting than
these questions of fact, however, was the manner in which the execu-
tive and legislative branches responded to the district court's
decision.
B. Legislative and Executive Responses to Chicago
In response to the district court's ruling, Congress sought to
make additional monies available to enable the United States to
comply with its obligations under the consent decree .2 5  On August
13, 1983, President Reagan vetoed one congressional effort,251 but
subsequently signed into law legislation continuing, among many ap-
propriations, funding for Chicago. 252
Congress had two motives for seeking to approve this funding.
First, it intended to assist Chicago's implementation of a desegrega-
tion plan; second, it wanted to encourage the district court to lift the
freeze on over $250 million in congressionally-authorized education
programs. With regard to the former reason, Congressman Yates (D-
Ill.) remarked that "approving this amendment will [make it] possi-
ble to begin carrying out the agreement between the board of educa-
tion and the Federal Government in accordance with the order of the
Court in the case. 2 53 Representative Conte (R-Mass.) directed his
remarks to the issue of alleviating the burden placed on federal edu-
cation programs by the district court's order. He argued:
The Department of Education should release these funds [to be
appropriated for Chicago] only upon receiving assurance that the
250 On July 29, 1983, the House agreed to an amendment to H.R. 3069, Supplemental
Appropriations, 1983, which would have provided $20 million for Chicago from unobligated
Guaranteed Student Loan funds. 129 CONG. REC. H5990-991 (daily ed. July 29, 1983). Due
to an enrolling error, that amendment was not included in the bill sent to, and approved by,
the Senate and subsequently signed into law. 129 CONG. REc. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1983). As a result, H.J. Res. 338 was passed by both Houses to "correct" P.L. 98-63 and
appropriate the $20 million for Chicago. 129 CONG. REc. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983);
129 CONG. REc. S11293 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983). The measure was vetoed. See note 251 infra.
251 H. J. Res., 338, 129 CONG. REG. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983).
252 Congress approved language appropriating the $20 million for Chicago in H.J. Res.
368, which contained appropriations for many federal agencies and programs. 129 CONG.
REC. H7623-625 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983); 129 CONG. Rvc. S13184 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
This resolution was signed into law on Oct. 1, 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983).
253 129 CONG. REC. H5990 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Yates).
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judicially imposed impoundment of discretionary funds for ele-
mentary and secondary education will be lifted. Otherwise, the
States and cities affected by the judge's order will get no relief
from this amendment. .. 254
Congressman Conte also suggested that the Chicago situation
pointed to the need for Congress to revitalize ESAA.255
In the letter accompanying the announcement of his veto of
House Joint Resolution 338 (to correct an enrollment error in P.L.
98-63), President Reagan noted "the extraordinarily important con-
stitutional principles raised by this particular measure. ' 25 6 Specifi-
cally, he thought unconstitutional the district court's order freezing
funds "appropriated by Congress for other educational programs. '2 57
He based his veto "upon [his] conviction that its process of separated
powers and checks and balances does not permit the judiciary to de-
termine spending priorities or to reallocate funds appropriated by
Congress."
2 58
Congress responded to that veto by adding to a continuing reso-
lution language appropriating $20 million to Chicago from unobli-
gated Guaranteed Student Loan funds. 25 9 Congress also
subsequently passed the so-called Weicker amendment, which sought
to lift the district court's freeze on other federal education pro-
grams.260 As incorporated into Public Law 98-13D, this provision
254 Id (remarks of Rep. Conte). Similarly, Representative Yates noted: "[B]ecause of the
Court's actions, the Follow Through grant for New Haven has been cut to $21,714 [from
S 173,713]. Follow Through grants for 76 other systems are similarly affected." Id (comment
of Rep. Yates). See note 248 supra.
255 Congressman Conte stated:
[I]f this situation requires any further resolution, the way it should be resolved is
through the reauthorization of the Emergency School Assistance Act. As the Mem-
bers will recall, this reauthorization has passed the House, on suspension, and is
pending in the Senate. Any further action on this situation in the Appropriations
Committee should depend upon that reauthorization. There are many other cities
whose desegregation plans have been thrown into disarray, and it is not fair that one
city should receive special treatment, at least prior to a final disposition of this case.
129 CONG. REG. H5990 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Conte); see notes 279-95
infta.
256 Press Release, The White House, Aug. 13, 1983.
257 Id
258 Id This congressional action and executive veto were of no significance in the appel-
late court order. Since the appellate court based its decision on narrow "availability of
funds" grounds, the issue of possible executive hostility to Chicago's (or any other school
district's) desegregation efforts was not reached by the appellate court. This issue was briefed
by both parties, however. See Brief, supra note 88, at 11; Reply Brief, supra note 234, at 11-12.
259 Pub. L. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983).
260 This amendment originally read:
No funds appropriated in any act to the Department of Education for 1983 and
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read:
No funds appropriated in any Act to the Department of Educa-
tion for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 shall be withheld from distri-
bution to grantees because of the provisions of the order entered
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on June 30, 1983: Provided, that the court's decree en-
tered on September 24, 1980, shall remain in full force and
effect .26 1
Despite the provision's limiting language, Senator Weicker (R.,
Conn.) noted that "[i]f additional funds were required to satisfy this
case beyond the $20 million [now] available, we will do whatever we
can to provide these funds at the appropriate time. '262
C. Judge Shadur-'sJune 8, 1984 Opin'on
In response to the Seventh Circuit's remand of Chzago II, Judge
Shadur issued an opinion suggesting that the "United States is obli-
gated to make every good faith effort to find and provide $103.858
million" for the 1984-85 school year.2 63 He also found that the
United States had failed to meet its obligation to "fashion its own
proposed remedy,"2 64 but suggested that he might lift his freeze on
various federal education programs.2 6 5
The key to this particular opinion was the court's flat rebuff to
three DOJ arguments. First, Judge Shadur rejected the separation of
powers argument that his earlier decision was "choking off deserving
education programs. 2 66 Second, he rejected the United States' con-
1984 other than those appropriated by section 111 of Public Law 98-107 shall be
available to fund the consent decree of 1980 between the United States and the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago.
129 CONG. REC. S13,506 (Oct. 4, 1983)(remarks of Sen. Weicker).
261 Pub. Law 98-139, § 209, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (Oct. 31, 1983).
262 129 CONG. REC. S13,506 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Weicker).
263 United States v. Board of Educ., 588 F. Supp. 132, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
264 Id at 211. Judge Shadur ruled that "[a]ll of the conduct of the United States ...
including its promulgation of regulations and proposals of legislation intended to render
funds unavailable to [the] Board for use in implementating the Plan ... constitutes both bad
faith conduct and willful violations of the Consent Decree and orders of this Court and the
Court of Appeals." Id at 212.
265 Id at 233-34.
266 Id at 138. Judge Shadur stated:
Because the United States has deliberately violated its original agreement to fund
the Chicago Desegregation Plan, this Court has reluctantly found it necessary to
prevent the distribution to other possible grantees of United States educational
funds, in order to preserve access to all the dollars that would be potentially avail-
able to fund the honoring of the United States' freely-undertaken (and freely bro-
ken) obligation to the Board.
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tention that Chicago should spend available federal funds on school
desegregation, claiming that "[s]uch a standard-forcing the robbing
of Peter to pay Paul-would render the United States' financial obli-
gations meaningless. ' 267 Finally, the court refused to scrutinize the
possibility that the Board was taking advantage of the United States
by including general school improvement programs in the desegrega-
tion budget.268 In so doing, the judge recognized as legitimate any
expenses that "materially aid [] the success of the overall desegrega-
tion effort. '269
The United States filed a response to the June 8 ruling.270 Basi-
cally, the United restated many of its arguments raised previously
before the court of appeals. A central claim of its arguments was the
fact that even if the president promised to seek special congressional
appropriations to fund Chicago's desegregation plan, the Court
would be powerless to enforce such an agreement against the execu-
tive. 27' The United States argued that it was meeting its consent
decree obligation, and pointed to a letter by Secretary of Education
Bell to the Illinois Superintendent of Education which urged Illinois
to provide more of its block grant funds to Chicago for school deseg-
regation purposes.2 72 The United States appealed the court's
order.2 73
D. Conclusions
Chicago II will probably be a costly lesson to the federal govern-
ment. Yet, it should be able to avoid future Chicago II's if the DOJ
spells out in desegregation consent decrees what funding obligations
the government is willing to undertake. The larger question, of
whether and to what extent the federal government should assist lo-
cal desegregation efforts, is not directly raised by the case. At the
Id at 139. Judge Shadur similarly noted that
[t]o date, I 1 separate letters have come in about the loss of a program that ...
sounds highly worthwhile. If the United States will not be candid and acknowledge
that this baby, and all the other orphans created by the United States' intransi-
gence, must be laid at its doorstep and not that of this Court, either this Court or
someone else ought to make that clear.
Id. at 138 n.l.
267 Id at 218.
268 See id at 220-21.
269 Id at 221.
270 See United States' Report to the Court, June 25, 1984.
271 Id at 2.
272 Id at 5-6.
273 See Brief for United States, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 84-2405 (7th Cir.
Aug. 23, 1984).
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same time, by forcing Congress to address the problem of the financ-
ing of local desegregation efforts, Chicago II has resulted in its reevalu-
ating the federal government's role in providing desegregation
assistance.27 4 Chicago II is also a challenge to the Reagan administra-
tion to support initiatives which will result in sufficient federal ex-
penditure for effective voluntary desegregation programs.
The basic substantive holding in Chicago II, that the government
has an affirmative obligation to take positive steps to help fund the
Board's plan, does not seem unreasonable. At the same time, the
government probably did not intend to obligate itself to become fin-
ancier of Chicago's costly voluntary school desegregation plan. The
Board, as well, probably expected the bulk of government assistance
to come from then existing federal aid programs. ESAA, the primary
desegregation assistance program extant when the decree was en-
tered into, provided sizable grants to urban school systems, but not
on the order of the amount cited in the most recent opinion from
Judge Shadur.2 75 It is difficult to conceive that the school board
could have reasonably expected to receive from the Federal govern-
ment annual grants for desegregation of anywhere near $104 million.
IV. Implications of Chicago
A. Legislative Concern With the Block Grant and Eforts to Revive ESAA
The Chicago litigation speaks to more than the pursuit of equal
educational opportunity in that city. It suggests that if the federal
government is committed to financing school desegregation, the cur-
rent block grant appears ineffective for the task.
The "new federalism" in education was intended to reduce fed-
eral intervention in local school affairs. To date, its principal result is
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of
1981 ("ECIA") which repealed over two dozen categorical education
programs, including the primary federal program assisting school de-
274 See note 255 supra and notes 279-95 infra.
275 Among the largest FY 1981 ESAA awards were the approximately S7 million received
by both Los Angeles and Milwaukee. J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 752.
It is not within the scope of this article to analyze the soundness of these decisions. These
decisions raise significant separation of powers issues. Initially, it is unclear whether the gov-
ernment can obligate itself either to commit funds or to seek to make funds available beyond
the current fiscal year. It is also possible that, with the repeal of ESAA, government funding
obligations were effectively voided. Finally, Congress may be able to alleviate the govern-
ment obligation through the passage of legislation or appropriations measures. These issues,
as well as others, will be addressed in a forthcoming article by Jeremy Rabkin and Neal
Devins.
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segregation efforts. The repealed program activities were continued
as authorized activities for block grant spending. Since school dis-
tricts have the discretion to spend their block grant funds for any
authorized activity, the ECIA in effect treats them all as equally wor-
thy of federal support. Thus, spending for school desegregation is
treated as no more important than spending for instructional materi-
als, or for programs in metric education or consumer education, all of
which are approved for spending in the block grant.276
The block grant's current structure precludes concentrating fed-
eral funds on particular activities. Its funds are distributed among
all local school districts in the country. In contrast, antecedent pro-
grams, including ESAA, focused on specific activities and often
funded only a small number of districts. Chicago, as a result, appar-
ently had a net decline between FY 1981 and FY 1982 in its funding
for activities covered by the block grant.277 The impact of this shift in
the distribution of resources may be exacerbated because the effec-
tive use of funds for certain activities depends in part upon the
amount of funding available. 278
Perhaps as significant as the level of assistance available is the
reluctance of school districts to pursue equal educational opportunity
absent outside intervention. Federal education support and the lev-
276 The Department of Education may soon learn this lesson about the current block
grant-it provides little leverage on school districts' actions. The FY 1985 budget request for
the Department of Education includes a $250 million increase for the Chapter 2 block grant.
According to Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell, this increase is intended to finance re-
form recommendations made by the National Commission on Excellence in Education. He
stated, "[t]hese funds can be used by States and local school districts to address such needs as
upgrading high school graduation requirements in the 'five new basics,' training teachers,
developing experimental pay plans, and expanding school days or years." Statement of T.H.
Bell, Secretary of Education, on the "Fiscal Year 1985 Budget," U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. NEWS,
Feb. 1, 1984, at 3. Of course, the Department cannot require that districts in fact spend their
Chapter 2 funds on those activities, a point already being made. In a recent article, a state
coordinator of Chapter 2 activities in an unidentified Rocky Mountain State is quoted as
saying, "[t]he local agencies have great discretion when it comes to spending this money. It
will be a real challenge directing them to funnel their money into new areas, especially when
you consider that the law specifically prohibits us from telling them what to do with their
block grants." Mirga, Chapter 2 Directors Question Plans for Block Grants, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 15,
1984, at 1, 14. Another coordinator from a northwestern state is quoted as saying, "we have
about 200 small districts in my state and one of our smallest ones received a grant of $65 last
year. . . . What do you think they'll do with a 50-percent increase?"
277 Comparing the antecedent funding level for FY 1981 with that for the Chapter 2 block
grant for FY 1982. R. JUNG & T. BARTELL, supra note 73, at 11, table 3. Chicago's drop in
funding was $426,017 (6.3% of its FY 1981 funding under the antecedent programs). But see
notes 234-36, supra for DOJ contention that Chicago actually fared better under the block
grant than it did under the antecedent programs.
278 See note 276 supra; American Association of School Administrators, supra note 74, at 18.
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erage it provided over school districts were used to remedy the dis-
tricts' lack of commitment to equal education opportunity
demonstrated between 1954 and 1964. The ESAA pre-grant review
procedure continued to exert pressure on districts as the price of fed-
eral aid. The lack of Chapter 2 spending by school districts on deseg-
regation-related activities appears to be in keeping with the history of
equal educational opportunity in local educational agencies. In par-
ticular, the way in which the block grant funds are spread among
school districts and the great local discretion over their use contrib-
ute to the program's ineffectiveness in addressing school desegrega-
tion needs. This conclusion appears to be one of the motives for
recent congressional action to create a new desegregation assistance
program for schools.
Congressional interest in the effects of the education block grant
on school desegregation grew over the past two years, resulting in
passage by the House of a bill to revive a modified ESAA program
and, subsequently, passage by both Houses of a program of assistance
for desegregation-related magnet schools.2 79 Although undoubtedly
it will not receive further Senate consideration due to passage of the
magnet schools program, the House bill to re-establish an ESAA pro-
gram merits some discussion because it illustrates congressional
thinking on the block grant and desegregation assistance. The bill
states that local educational agencies do not have the additional re-
sources required to eliminate or prevent minority group isolation and
to improve education for all children.2 80 It notes that some school
districts need additional funds to complete activities begun with
ESAA funds,281 and authorizes $100 million for FY 1984 and such
279 H.R. 2207 (Emergency School Aid Act) was passed by the House on June 7, 1983,
under suspension of the rules. 129 CONG. REC. H3692 (daily ed. June 7, 1983). H.R. 1310
(Education for Economic Security Act) as passed by the Senate on June 27, 1984, contains a
title authorizing a Magnet School Assistance Program. 130 CONG. REc. S8440 (daily ed.
June 27, 1984). The magnet school title was added and the program approved by the Senate
on June 6, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. S6682 (daily ed. June 6, 1984). The House approved the
Senate-pased version on July 25, 1984. 130 CONG. REc. H7745 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
280 Emergency School Aid Act, H.R. REP. 98-136 to accompany H.R. 2207, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1983). The report on the legislation by the House Committee on Education and
Labor stated:
The need for desegregation assistance has not diminished. Desegregation of public
schools is a national goal, requiring a national effort to achieve. The absence of
Federal aid makes it less likely that school districts will be as able or willing to
undertake this massive commitment. Without the crucial educational and commu-
nity activities supported by ESAA, school desegregation does not work.
Id
281 The committee reported that the block grant "drastically reduc[ed] desegregation-re-
lated programs in hundreds of school districts around the country." Id at 2.
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sums as may be necessary for the next two fiscal years. The House
proposal modifies the previous act primarily by eliminating a state-
based allotment formula applied to a portion of ESAA funds. It
would continue the nondiscrimination requirements and the pre-
grant review from the previous act.28 2
In dissent, four members of the Education and Labor Commit-
tee argued that the school desegregation "emergency" was over, the
"integrity" of the block grant was at stake, the legislation was unnec-
essary since ESAA activities were already authorized under the block
grant, and ESAA funding had been misused in the past.283 The dis-
senters questioned whether the legislation was "only a first step in the
dismantling of the block grant, as those who did not fare as well
under the block grant funding process seek to regain Federal
dollars." 284
Representative Goodling (R-Pa.), in individual views presented
in the committee report, stated that although he was an architect of
the current education block grant, he viewed the legislation to reen-
act ESAA as honoring a "moral commitment to extend some limited,
special assistance, particularly to those districts caught in the middle
of an expensive ongoing desegregation plan when ESAA was re-
pealed and placed in the block grant. ' 285 On the House floor during
deliberation, Representative Goodling observed that, despite the
block grant's authorization of ESAA activities, "the substate formula
decisions made at the State level have made it almost impossible for
the districts that formerly relied heavily on ESAA grants to complete
the programs they embarked upon. '28 6 The idea that a revived
ESAA would support voluntary desegregation efforts apparently ap-
pealed to many House members. Representative Goodling noted
that ESAA is "a natural complement to the [Justice] Department's
[voluntary] approach to school desegregation.1 28 7 Representative
Conte expressed his support of the legislation "so that cities that have
worked out voluntary, locally-developed plans, can continued their
efforts to provide a quality education to all children. '288
The desegregation assistance program ultimately passed by both
Houses of Congress had its origin in the Senate. The previously dis-
282 See id
283 Id at 22-24.
284 Id at 23.
285 Id at 20.
286 129 CONC. REC. H3587 (daily ed. June 6, 1983).
287 Id
288 Id at H3588.
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cussed House bill to revive ESAA encountered hostility in the Sen-
ate.289 A compromise over desegregation aid was nevertheless
reached and adopted as an amendment to a bill to improve math
and science education.290 The amendment authorizes $75 million a
year for FY 1984 through FY 1986 for a Magnet Schools Assistance
program to support the planning, establishment, and conduct of
magnet schools that are part of an eligible desegregation plan.291
Some critics of a new ESAA program have argued that ways of
targeting funds within the current education block grant short of es-
tablishing a new categorical aid program should be explored.292 For
example, intrastate allocation formulas could be made sensitive to
the districts' desegregation-related needs, or the legislation could
specify some priorities. One cannot tell, of course, whether continu-
ing ESAA would have prevented the litigation in Chicago over the
federal financial obligation to that city's desegregation plan.293 Nev-
ertheless, its repeal certainly played a pivotal role in the litigation.
Judge Shadur apparently viewed the fact that the administration
289 Hatch Said to Seek Compromise on Desegregation-Aid Stalemate, EDUC. WEEK, May 2, 1984,
at 14.
290 130 CONG. REC. S6673-82 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (adoption of amendment to
S.1285); 130 CONG. REc. S8440 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (passage of H.R. 1310 with text of
S.1285 as amended inserted in lieu thereof).
291 See 130 CONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton (D-Mo.)
concerning the bill's narrow focus).
To be eligible for funding under the bill, a school district must have lost $1 million in
federal funding in the first year following the repeal of ESAA, or must be implementing a
court or state-ordered desegregation plan, or a voluntary plan complying with Title VI. A
district must further assure that it will not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, or
national origin in hiring, promoting or assigning employees, assigning students to schools or
courses of instruction (unless part of the desegregation plan), or in conducting extracurricular
activities. According to the remarks of one sponsor, the Department of Education must show
intent before finding a district in violation. 130 CONG. REC. S6681 (daily ed. June 6,
1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
Supporters of the legislation cited numerous examples of school districts that had suf-
fered serious funding losses with the repeal of ESAA. See 130 CONG. REC. S6675-76 (remarks
of Sen. Eagleton), S6676-77 (remarks of Sen. Bradley (D-N.J.)), S6679-81 (remarks of Sen.
Moynihan (D-N.Y.)) (daily ed. June 6, 1984).
292 House Report, supra note 280, at 23.
293 The availability of ESAA funding has played a similar role in previous litigation. In
1981, the Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision in litigation concerning school
desegregation in St. Louis. One item being appealed was the lower court's failure to order
that the U.S. had to pay for some of the costs of the desegregation of the city's schools. The
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, noting in part that in 1980-81 the U.S. had pro-
vided more than $7 million in ESAA funds to St. Louis, and "the evidence in the record gives
us no reason to believe that similar funding will not be available to continue implementation
of the plan for the forseeable future." Liddel v. Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 643, 654 (1981); see
also Liddel v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (1980).
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"sought and supported in Congress the repeal of ESAA," 294 as one
finding showing that "the Executive Branch . . . and the Depart-
ment of Education have been engaged in a continuous effort to strip
away all means by which they could fulfill the United States' obliga-
tion under Section 15.1." '295
Chicago may also have an effect on a new desegregation assist-
ance program. Judge Shadur has ruled that the consent decree re-
quires the United States to provide funding for five years, beginning
with the 1983-84 school year.296 Given the events of the past year,
and in light of the substantial amount of federal assistance Judge
Shadur has ruled is owed Chicago, a new desegregation assistance
program might be a likely target for another judicially-imposed
freeze pending resolution of the litigation.
B. Implications of the Administration's Education Poliy
Perhaps the greatest irony in this situation lies in the Reagan
administration's position on desegregation and the "new federalism."
On one hand, the administration clearly prefers voluntary desegrega-
tion methods to mandatory reassignment of students.2 97 Chicago,
with its reliance on voluntary measures, may be something of a show-
case for demonstrating the effectiveness of that approach in an urban
school system. 298 On the other hand, the administration apparently
is not prepared to seek the financial support required to implement a
voluntary school desegregation plan.29 9 Confronted with judicial rul-
ings that it has an obligation to provide such support in Chicago, the
administration responded by challenging them, even when it ap-
peared that Chicago was unable to finance the plan alone. Thus, it is
not clear what is of most importance to the Reagan administration-
success of the Chicago desegregation effort, reducing federal involve-
ment in education, or resisting perceived judicial threats to the bal-
ance of power controlling federal education funding.
For local school officials, Chicago teaches that the "new federal-
ism" may be a two-edged sword. The likelihood may now be greater
294 567 F. Supp. at 276.
295 Id at 280.
296 Id at 287.
297 See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
298 See text accompanying notes 191-93 supra.
299 Recent consent decrees entered into by the DOJ with the school boards of Lima, Ohio,
and Bakersfield, California, rely exclusively on voluntary desegregation methods. Neither
decree provides for federal financial support for the plans. See Mirga and Caldwell, US
Approves Voluntagy Plans to Desegregate, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 1, 1984, at 1, 15.
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of negotiating a consent decree with the DOJ that relies on voluntary
methods of desegregation.3 0 But the "new federalism" not only
seeks to reduce federal direction of education, but also seeks to reduce
the federal financial presence in education, with the result that little
federal funding is being directed to school desegregation. From a
school district's perspective, the prospect of a voluntary, negotiated
plan may be appealing, but the burden of financing that plan will
rest solely on the school district and the state, unless the consent de-
cree clearly obligates the federal government to provide this support.
But it does not seem likely that the administration will agree to lan-
guage similar to Section 15.1 of the Chicago consent degree.
Summary of Conclusions
The federal government professes an interest in equal educa-
tional opportunity. If that interest necessitates a federal funding
role, the present education block grant appears inadequate to pro-
vide the financial support needed to assist local efforts to desegregate
schools. As the situation in Chicago shows, the success of voluntary
desegregation may be affected by the "new federalism" in education.
Addendum
On September 26, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit overturned the remedial order of the district court. United States
v. Board of Educ., slip. op. No. 84 -2405, (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 1984). The
Court of Appeals noted that since the federal government was now '"prepared to
give the Board priority in the distribution of desegregation funds under existing
federal programs," it had satisfed its contractual obl'ation to assist in the
funding of Chicago school desegregation. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The
court rejected the district court's holding that the administration breached the
consent decree by engaging in legislative activities that efectiveoy reduced deseg-
regation funds for the school board The court did not determine an amount due
to the Board, however, and remanded the case to the district court 'for a determi-
nation of whether the Board is receiving the maximum level offunding that is
available under the criteria of programs through which funds for desegregation
can be dispersed " Id. at 13.
300 Id
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